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1. Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Aims of the Study 
 
The underlying rationale behind the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is to 
strike a balance between the interests of IPR holders on the one hand and users of 
protected knowledge on the other hand.1 The thesis seeks to achieve the following 
objectives: 
 
o To create a good understanding of the historical development of the primary and 
secondary legal instruments related to the IPRs/public health debate. It is 
important to create this understanding in order to fully appreciate the significance 
of developments in the area.  
 
o To determine to what extent a balance is struck by the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) with reference to the 
flexibilities provided for in the Treaty, read together with the subsequent World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Declarations and TRIPS Council 
Decisions. 
 
o To evaluate the extent to which selected developing and least developed country 
(LDC) members of the WTO have taken measures to implement the said 
flexibilities, taking cognizance of their relevant strengths and weaknesses.  
 
o To suggest ways in which select countries in the developing world specifically 
India and Zambia can take greater advantage of the flexibilities to promote better 
access to medicines while taking into consideration various opportunities and 
threats that are foreseeable.  
                                                 
1 This principle is well enunciated in the Objectives  of  the TRIPS Agreement in Article 7. 
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o To identify Public Health aspects of TRIPS that the developing country and LDC 
WTO members would do well to address in further negotiations. 
 
1.2 Background to the Study 
 
The TRIPS Agreement extends to all WTO members the obligation to confer the range of 
IPRs traditionally enjoyed only in the first world. Ostensibly developing countries and 
LDCs benefit from the innovations triggered by strengthened IPRs, as well as from the 
provisions that are supposed to encourage the transfer of technology. The Agreement has 
been criticized, however, for being weighted in favor of special interests in developed 
countries, with few tangible benefits for people in the developing world.2 A further and 
crucial criticism of the IPRs provided for by TRIPS is that they result in higher prices for 
essential drugs which restrict access to these crucial medicines for the poor.3 
 
It was in this vein that from the onset of The Uruguay Round negotiations, the developing 
world strongly objected to IPRs being incorporated into the multilateral trading regime. 
The objections were made with particular reference to subjecting inventions related to 
public health and nutrition to strict patenting rules.4 WTO members like the United States 
of America (USA) and Switzerland on the other hand represented the interests of their 
pharmaceutical industry constituency (Pharma).5 It was these countries whose interests 
prevailed at Uruguay as IPRs were placed firmly within the realm of the WTO.6  
                                                 
2 See, Frederick M. Abbott, "The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Medicines and the WTO Doha Ministerial 
Conference", Florida State University College of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No 
36, (2001), (Hereinafter, Abbott (2001)),  : ‘The developing  countries and LDCs were placed under great 
political and economic pressure to accept terms that did not adequately take into account their specific 
interests’ 
 
3 See, Report of the High Commissioner, The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, para 42 
 
4 See, statements made by Indian delegate, Note by the Secretariat, Meeting of  Negotiating Group of 12-14 
July 1989, Negotiating Group of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in 
Counterfeit Goods, MTN. GNG/NG11/14, 12 September 1989, at, e.g. para.79.1.    
 
5 This abbreviation is frequently used by Frederick M. Abbott; I will do the same interchangeably. 
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Despite requiring developing countries to enforce stringent patent protection and 
exclusive rights,7 there were provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that left various policy 
options or flexibilities available for the developing countries to utilize. 
 
Initially use of the flexibilities was curtailed in that developing countries that attempted 
to take advantage thereof were subjected to aggressive campaigns by developed countries 
and Pharma.8  
 
The balance created by TRIPS was thus perceived to be firmly in favor of the North. The 
Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health in November 2001 is hailed as 
a turning point in redressing this imbalance.9  
 
The value of the Declaration rests in its clarification of the relationship between the 
TRIPS Agreement and the public health policies of WTO members and in its definition 
of the flexibility of several relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement, in particular 
with regards to patents.10 
 
In attempting to utilize the flexibilities a number of developing countries have issued 
compulsory licenses in the past few years.11 Notwithstanding these efforts, further 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6 See, Frederick M Abbott, "The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Lighting a 
Dark Corner at the WTO’, (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic Law, (hereinafter, Abbott, Lighting 
a Dark Corner), p 469 – 505.  
 
7 See Article 27(1)TRIPS and Article 28 TRIPS 
 
8 See Request for Consultations by the United States, Brazil Measures Affecting Patent Protection, 
WT/DS199/1, G/L/385,IP/D/23,8 June 2000,  Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United 
States, Brazil Measures Affecting Patent Protection,WT/DS199/39,January 2001, and the case brought by 
39 pharmaceutical companies against Nelson Mandela and the South African Department of Health. 
 
9 The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2. 
(Hereinafter, the Doha Declaration). 
 
10 See Paul Vandoren, “Classification of the Relationship between TRIPS and Public Health Resulting from 
the WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration”, (2002) 5.  Journal of World Intellectual Property, 5-13.  
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utilization of the flexibilities by countries in the South is necessary to promote greater 
access to essential medicines. It is thus necessary to evaluate the factors that have to date 
hindered more meaningful use of the flexibilities and are likely to pose future threats to 
their utilization in order to suggest solutions to these obstacles and to facilitate greater 
access to essential medicines. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
The debate on the protection of IPRs in the domain of public health has been a heated 
one. Since the inception of the TRIPS Agreement, a huge divergence in the interests and 
thus perspectives of IPR holders as compared to those of the users of protected products 
has become evident. The challenge thus is to strike a balance between these deeply 
divided interests in the arena of public health. The thesis examines how the TRIPS 
Agreement has attempted to strike this elusive balance through the so called flexibilities. 
It assesses selected countries’ efforts to utilize the flexibilities so as to tilt the balance 
towards their direction and looks into ways that the flexibilities could be used more 
meaningfully by the same. 
 
1.4 Scope 
 
The thesis will be limited to issues that arise from the patent protection provided by 
TRIPS in the domain of public health in developing countries and LDCs, the comparative 
analysis portion will focus on India and Zambia.  
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 See Tenu Avafia, Jonathan Berger and Trudi Hartzenberg, "The Ability of Select Sub-Saharan African 
Countries to Utilize TRIPS Flexibilities and Competition Law to Ensure a Sustainable Supply of Essential 
Medicines: A study of producing and importing countries".  
Available at:  
www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/Trade%20and%20Competition%2030%203%2006%20final%20Edit
1%20_2_%20_2_.pd (Last Accessed on 5th September 2006). (Hereinafter, Avafia, Burger and 
Hartzenberg). 
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Two thirds (63%) of all adults and children with HIV globally live in sub-Saharan Africa, 
with its epicentre in southern Africa. One third (32%) of all people with HIV globally 
live in southern Africa and 34% of all deaths due to AIDS in 2006. 12  
 
Other pandemics such as malaria and tuberculosis are still rampant.  Of the estimated one 
million malaria deaths that occur annually in the world, 90% are in Africa.13 In addition 
the extent of the damage that could be done by the recent strain of extreme drug resistant 
tuberculosis14 has not yet been determined.  
 
Zambia like many sub Saharan African countries is disproportionately affected by 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria with an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate among 
pregnant adult women of 18-20% and approximately three million clinical cases of 
malaria every year resulting in 50 000 deaths annually.15 
 
When one considers these statistics it becomes apparent that access to affordable 
medicines is crucial for countries where these deadly diseases are so prevalent. Therefore 
it is imperative for governments in these countries to develop policies and legislation that 
are geared to addressing these pandemics as effectively as possible. This reality 
underpins the thesis and it is intended that as a result of the analysis undertaken therein, 
some guidelines will be proposed that may prove useful to developing country and LDC 
governments in their domestic policy and in the multilateral arena.  
 
1.6 Methodology 
                                                 
12 See UNAIDS/WHO "AIDS Epidemic Update: December 2006" (Available online):  
http://data.unaids.org/pub/EpiReport/2006/2006_EpiUpdate_en.pdf  (Last accessed on 12th December 
2006)  
13 ibid 
 
14 See, The Guardian, “Scientists discovered the strain in August 2006 among HIV- infected patients in the 
Kwazulu-Natal region”. Available at: http://observer.guardian.co.uk/world/story/0,,1863850,00.html (Last 
accessed on 23rd August 2006). 
Scientists discovered the strain in August 2006 among HIV-infected patients in the Kwazulu-Natal region. 
'Fifty two of the 53 infected people are already dead’ 
 
15 See, UNAIDS. 2005. Report on the Global Epidemic. Available at: 
http://unaids.org/epi/2005/doc/EPIupdate2005 pdf en/ Epi05 05 en.pdf  
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The research essentially entails two methodologies: a literature review and comparative 
analysis of relevant international instruments and the laws of India and Zambia. This will 
be done in order to gauge the potential utility of the TRIPS flexibilities and their 
implementation in the selected countries. 
 
Thus, primary and secondary sources relevant to the TRIPS/public health debate will be 
essential. These include Treaties, WTO Declarations and Decisions, WTO Panel and 
Appellate Body decisions, WTO communications, domestic legislation of various 
countries, books, articles and internet websites. 
 
1.7 Overview of the Chapters 
 
The thesis consists of the following five chapters:  
 
Chapter 1 
 
The first chapter contains the introduction which sets out the context and scope of the 
research, identifies the major issues to be addressed and outlines the methodology. 
 
Chapter 2 
 
The second chapter describes the historical development of the TRIPS Agreement, the 
provisions of the Treaty that have come to be called flexibilities and the related WTO 
Declarations and Decisions on the implementation of the flexibilities. 
 
Chapter 3 
 
The third chapter contains a critique of the TRIPS Agreement. It seeks to address the 
question of whether the flexibilities read in conjunction with the related WTO 
instruments are sufficient to strike an acceptable balance between the interests of IPR 
 12
holders on one hand and the public health interests of users in the developing world on 
the other. 
 
Chapter 4 
 
The fourth chapter examines the extent to which India and Zambia have implemented and 
utilized the TRIPS flexibilities. It identifies and comments upon the factors which 
facilitate meaningful utilization of the flexibilities by such countries, as well as the 
prevalent obstacles. 
 
Chapter 5 
 
The final chapter considers and concludes as to what extent the TRIPS flexibilities are 
sufficient to advance access to medicines in developing countries and LDCs and the 
extent to which India and Zambia have made adequate use of the TRIPS flexibilities in 
the context of public health. Finally, some recommendations are proposed that may assist 
the countries to use the flexibilities to a greater extent. 
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2. Chapter 2: Laying the Basis 
The Historical Dimension: An Illustration of the Build - up to TRIPS  
 
This introduction is necessary to appreciate important historical facets of the drive to 
place IP within the realm of the multilateral trading system at the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
 
Most developing countries had originally acquired their patent laws via the colonial 
experience. This trend can be seen for instance in the case of the Philippines. While they 
remained a Spanish Colony it was Spanish patent law that applied. After December 1898 
when the US took over the administration of the Philippines, patent applications went to 
the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for assessment under US law until 1947 
when the Philippines adopted an independent patent system largely based on US patent 
law.16 Similarly India acquired a patent law in 1856 while under British rule.17 
 
After World War II many developing countries became independent states. Some of them 
began to review the operation of the IP systems that had been left to them by their 
colonizers. So, for example, after independence India decided to redesign their patent law 
to suit her own national circumstances being a country with a low research and 
development (R&D) base, with a large population of poor people and having some of the 
highest drug prices in the world. Thus in 1970 a new patent law was passed which 
allowed the patenting of methods or processes that led to drugs, but did not allow the 
patenting of the drugs (pharmaceutical products) themselves. Further, patent protection 
for pharmaceuticals was only granted for seven years as opposed to fourteen years for 
                                                 
16 See,  Arthur Wineburg, “ Intellectual Property Protection in Asia”, (1999) 2, Lexis Law Publishing, 
Charlottesville, Virginia, quoted in Peter Drahos, “Developing Countries and International IP Standard 
Setting” Available at: http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/study_papers.htm  (Last accessed 
on 11th January 2007). (Hereinafter, Peter Drahos). 
 
17 See Peter Drahos, p 12.  
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other inventions. This law became the foundation stone for a highly successful Indian 
generics industry.18  
 
During the same period Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and the Andean Pact countries all 
passed laws that saw patent rights in the pharmaceutical area weakened. Developing 
country generic manufacturers thus became a threat to the western pharmaceutical cartels 
that had dominated the international pharmaceutical industry. Mexico’s entry into the 
manufacture of steroids in the 1960s, for example, contributed to the end of the European 
cartel that had dominated production until then.19 
 
The new IP standards adopted were as varied as they were novel as they were enacted to 
meet the individual situations and needs of the respective states. This was unfavorable to 
technology based industries as they preferred a legal framework that would maximize 
predictability and uniformity.    
 
All this occurred while the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
1883 (Paris Convention) administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) was in operation. In fact a study undertaken by WIPO in 1988 for the negotiating 
group that was dealing with TRIPS in the Uruguay Trade Round revealed that of the 98 
members of the Paris Convention, 49 excluded pharmaceutical products from 
protection.20 
 
These events from the perspective of pharmaceutical industry leaders in the north 
indicated that WIPO had failed to secure their interests in higher and standardized patent 
regimes. They were also seen as catalysts for thriving generic industries in countries like 
                                                 
18 Ibid  
 
19 G. Gereffi, The Pharmaceutical Industry and Dependency in the Third World’, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1983, quoted in Peter Drahos (note 1).  
 
20 See, WIPO (1988) ‘Existence, scope and form of generally internationally accepted and applied 
standards/norms for the protection of intellectual property’, WO/INF/29 September 1988, issued as GATT 
document number MTN.GNG/NG11/W/24/REv.1., quoted in Peter Drahos (note 1). 
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India, Brazil, Mexico an Argentina that were eroding the northern monopoly in the 
pharmaceutical industry.   
 
WIPO was not an ideal forum form which to protect the northern interest in strengthened 
IP laws as their proposals could always be defeated by developing country blocs whose 
national interests conflicted with the interests of developed countries. Another perceived 
inadequacy of WIPO was the lack of an effective prohibitive enforcement mechanism. 
Pharma’s dissatisfaction with the protection of their interests during the 1970’s was 
encapsulated in the words of then General Counsel to Pfizer Lou Clemente who declared:  
 
“Our experience with WIPO was the last straw in our attempts to operate by persuasion”.21 
 
The US responded in the 1980’s by adopting a policy of forum shifting by pushing for 
IPRs to be made a multilateral trade topic under the GATT. This US drive marked the 
birth of the TRIPS agreement. 
 
2.2 The Incorporation of IP into the Multilateral Trading System 
 
As noted above, there had been a trend in the 1970s toward developing countries 
adapting their IPR systems in line with their varied levels of development. This conflicted 
with the interests of various industries in the industrialized countries (including pharma) 
which led the industrialized countries together with concerned industries in the 1980’s to 
take the baton from the Anti - Counterfeiting Coalition and seek to reverse the direction 
of change from greater flexibility toward a tightened IP system.22  
 
                                                 
21 See ‘Pfizer: Protecting Intellectual Property in a Global Marketplace’, Harvard Business School, 1992, 8, 
quoted in Peter Drahos (note 1). 
 
22 The Anti Counterfeiting Coalition refers to the group of trademark holding firms which in the 1973-1979 
GATT Tokyo Round, unsuccessfully lobbied for the inclusion of an anti - counterfeiting code in the GATT.   
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The convergence of several factors explain the predisposition of certain industrialized 
countries, particularly the US to identifying strengthened IPRs for their industries with 
national interests and the priority given to reforming the IP system worldwide. The most 
pressing of the said factors as advanced by Professor Correa are as follows:23 
 
First, technology had become a crucial factor in international competition, particularly for 
the production of technology intensive goods and services. This trend was reflected by 
the increase of R&D expenditure by industrialized countries since the1970s with growing 
participation of the private sector in R&D. Half or more of R&D expenditure in these 
countries was funded by the private sector, particularly by big companies in science 
intensive industries such as pharma.24  
 
Secondly, the reduction of Trade barriers in developing countries increased the chances 
of direct exports to those countries, strengthened IPRs were seen as necessary to allow 
industrialized countries to trade rather than diffuse their technology. They thus sought 
exemption from the obligation to exploit patented inventions locally or to transfer 
technology to local firms as many developing countries required in their patent laws. 
 
Thirdly and perhaps most crucially, US leadership in manufacturing and technology was 
challenged by the catching up of Japan and a few other countries, including Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NICs) which became aggressive competitors in technology 
intensive industries. The erosion of US technological leadership coupled with the high 
US trade deficit were perceived in the US as resulting from open IPR systems that  
allowed other countries to imitate US innovations and gave rise to the proliferation of 
counterfeiting and piracy.  
 
                                                 
23 See, Carlos M. Correa, “Intellectual Property Rights, The WTO and the Developing Countries: The 
TRIPS Agreement and Policy Options”, Published by Third World Network, (2000). 
 
24 Ibid. 
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The monopoly position conferred by strengthened IPRs was thus seen as an instrument 
for neutralizing the relative loss in competitiveness of US products and services as well 
as preventing further catching up based on imitative paths of industrialization.25 
 
The above factors together with industrialized countries losing faith in WIPO’s ability to 
protect their interests made the dispute settlement mechanism within the GATT seem 
very attractive as it allowed cross retaliation for non - fulfillment of specific obligations. 
The incorporation of IP into the GATT framework thus became a crucial issue for 
industrialized countries. This forum shifting however could only be achieved at the 
negotiation table. 
 
2.3 The TRIPS Negotiations 
 
The Uruguay Round introduced multilateral negotiations on IPRs which resulted in the 
TRIPS Agreement. The treaty is by coverage the most comprehensive instrument on IPRs 
in existence establishing minimum standards on 7 categories of IPRs including most 
crucially, patents.26  The treaty was a welcome result for industrialized countries and 
their industries.   
 
The developing countries and LDCs were ambivalent throughout the negotiations as they 
foresaw the minimum standards having a whole host of serious implications for their 
development. Of particular relevance to this paper are the implications arising from the 
ability of the patent holder to exclude direct competition and charge higher prices for 
patented medicines than would have occurred in a competitive market making the 
medicines unaffordable in countries disproportionately affected by disease.  
 
                                                 
25 Ibid  
 
26 Copyrights and related rights, including computer programs and phonograms and databases, trademarks, 
geographical indications, industrial designs, integrated circuits and undisclosed information (trade secrets) 
were the other protected categories. 
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In spite of the concerns of developing countries, the TRIPS Agreement extended globally 
(among WTO members at least), the standards of IP protection traditionally enjoyed only 
in the industrialized world.27  
 
Many in the south are of the view that the process of drafting the TRIPS Agreement was 
not a real `negotiating' process, for the exercise hardly involved any give and take in that 
developing countries made considerable concessions in agreeing to the higher levels of 
protection of IPRs demanded by industrialized countries, while they were not in any way 
compensated by advantages in this or other areas of the Uruguay Round negotiations.28 
 
This view can be juxtaposed with the northern perspective that the TRIPS agreement was 
produced as a result of bargaining amongst sovereign and equal states all having the 
capacity to conclude treaties and which agreed to TRIPS as part of a larger package of 
trade-offs in which there were gains for all.  
 
The theory of democratic bargaining propounded by Professor Drahos may serve as an 
objective standard from which to gauge the legitimacy of the TRIPS negotiation process. 
 
The theory comprises 3 elements that should be fulfilled in order to legitimize a 
bargaining process. Firstly, the condition of representation meaning all relevant interests 
must be represented in the process. Second, the condition of full information that is all 
those involved in the negotiation must have full information about the consequences of 
various possible outcomes. Finally, the condition of non - domination, ie no party must 
coerce others.29  
 
                                                 
27 See, Paul Vandoren, “Classification of the Relationship between TRIPS and Public Health Resulting 
from the WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration”, (2002) 5.  Journal of World Intellectual Property, 5-13  
 
28 See, South Centre, ‘Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights. A New Regime’, Available at: 
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/trips/tripsmaintexttrans-01.htm (Last Accessed on 13th January 
2007) 
 
29 See Peter Drahos (note 1) 
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With regard to the first element, the north would argue that the condition was met in that 
developing country leaders like India and Brazil sent negotiators. 
 
The south on the other hand would argue that the first condition of the theory was not met 
because exclusion was practiced, the TRIPS negotiations therefore failed to meet the first 
condition on those grounds. 
 
The most convincing evidence in favor or the southern view is that the negotiations 
involved the use of non - representational circles of consensus. This describes a process 
which emerged in the GATT framework whereby the issues were first placed before a 
smaller group to be meted out and then expanded to create larger circles until the goals of 
those in the inner circle had been met. 30 The first three circles included US, Europe, 
Japan and Canada (Quad) respectively and it was in these three groups that much of the 
real negotiating was done and where the consensus and agreement that mattered was 
obtained. The circles of consensus meant effectively that the TRIPS Agreement was very 
much a product of the first the Quad states, therefore developing countries and LDCs 
were excluded from any groups which mattered. 
 
The use of circles of consensus also makes it difficult to claim that the second condition 
of democratic bargaining, namely full information, was fulfilled. The composition of the 
circles meant the US and Europe could move amongst all the key groups. This allowed 
them to soak up more information than anyone else about the overall negotiations and 
whenever they needed higher levels of secrecy they could reform into a smaller 
negotiating group. 
 
The third condition of democratic bargaining one could argue was the condition of 
democratic bargaining which was breached in the most egregious fashion during the 
TRIPS negotiation process, an argument difficult to contend.  
                                                 
30 See, Christophe Bellmann, Graham Dutfield and Ricardo Meléndez - Ortiz , “Trading in Knowledge 
Development Perspectives on TRIPS, Trade and Sustainability”, ICTSD (2003), Published by Earthscan 
Publications 
 
 20
 
To support this argument it can be pointed out that in 1988 the US adapted Section 301 of 
its Trade Act 1974 to meet its IP objectives. This required the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) to identify foreign countries that denied adequate and effective 
protection of IPRs or denied fair and equitable market access to US IP holders.
 
Also 
significant were changes to the system of Generalized Special Preferences (GSP). The 
President in deciding whether a developing country’s products were to gain preferential 
treatment under the GSP system had to give ‘great weight’ to its protection of foreign 
IPRs. 
 
Section 301 proved instrumental to US interests three years after the Uruguay Ministerial 
Declaration in 1986. India, Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, Egypt, Nicaragua Nigeria, Peru, 
Tanzania and Yugoslavia continued to argue for a narrow interpretation of the Ministerial 
mandate on the negotiation of IP that is only to “clarify GATT provisions relating to IPRs 
and counterfeit goods” and to “develop a multilateral framework of principles, rules and 
disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods”.31 
 
The US broke the resistance of these ‘hard liners’ using the amended or Special 301 
which swung into action in the beginning of 1989. When the USTR announced the 
targets of Special 301, five of the ten developing countries that were members of the hard 
line group that were opposing the US agenda found themselves listed for bilateral 
attention. Brazil and India, the two leaders, were placed in the more serious category of 
Priority Watch List, while Argentina, Egypt and Yugoslavia were put on the Watch 
List.32 
 
Thus for many developing countries, gaining access to the closed and subsidized 
agricultural markets of developed countries was a carrot that proved too hard to resist; 
while the threat of US trade sanctions was a stick that mandated compliance. These 
                                                 
31 See Peter Drahos, p14. 
 
32 Ibid 
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realities point strongly towards the argument that the TRIPS negotiations failed at least to 
meet the democratic bargaining condition of non - domination as Special 301 and the 
threat of losing out on market access were ever prevalent factors throughout the 
negotiations that resulted in the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
2.4 The TRIPS Flexibilities Identified 
 
The aim of this section is to create a good understanding of what is meant by the term 
“TRIPS flexibilities” and to clearly identify which of these flexibilities will be discussed 
in the remainder of the thesis.    
 
The TRIPS flexibilities refer to the ability of WTO Members to exploit creative solutions 
to transpose into national law and practice those concepts that the TRIPS Agreement 
simply enunciates but does not define.33 
 
The flexibilities to be discussed were selected based on the availability of data and 
relevance to developing countries and LDCs; they are as follows: 
 
Transition periods; patentability criteria and exemption from patentability; parallel 
importation; as well as compulsory licensing and government use. 
 
2.4.1 Transition Periods: 
 
Transition periods constitute the amount of time available for a WTO Member to bring 
itself into full conformity with the obligations of the Agreement.34 The periods prescribed 
to developing countries have lapsed. Accordingly, developing countries were obliged to 
implement the TRIPS Agreement by enacting patent legislation that complied with the 
                                                 
33 See, “Advice on Flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement”. Available at: http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/legislative_assistance/advice_trips.html (Last Accessed on 12th May 2007). 
34 See Articles 65 and 66(1) TRIPS of the TRIPS Agreement.  
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treaty’s minimum standards of IP protection by 2000.35 With regard to pharmaceutical 
patents, the deadline for implementation in countries that previously did not grant such 
protection of a compliant product patent regime was 2005.36   
 
Although the developing country deadlines for full implementation have passed, 
meaningful usage of the developing country transition period by countries such as India 
has facilitated access to affordable generic medication in many developing countries even 
to this day.37 The use of other flexibilities by developing countries will assume 
tremendous importance in years to come now that they must comply with the TRIPS 
Agreement.  
 
Full TRIPS compliance is crucial not just for developing countries which have had to 
bring their patent laws into compliance, particularly India with its’ significant 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. It is crucial for LDCs with limited to no 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity because these countries have relied heavily on 
India to supply affordable generic medicines.  
 
With regard to LDCs, a decision by the WTO’s TRIPS Council in 2005 extended the 
transition period for least-developed countries by seven and a half years. The transition 
period was due to expire on 1 January 2006; 11 years after the TRIPS Agreement came 
into force. 
 
The decision does not affect the transition period for patents for pharmaceutical products, 
which was agreed in 2002 pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration; least-
developed countries will not have to protect these patents until 2016. 38 
                                                 
35 See Article 65.2 TRIPS of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
36 See Article 65.4 TRIPS of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
37 For instance in 2003, the Malaysian government issued a compulsory license to import generic ARVs 
from India to be used in public hospitals. 
 
38 See Article 66.1 TRIPS and  Council for TRIPS, “Extension of the transition period under Article 66.1 of 
the TRIPS Agreement for Least Developed Country Members for certain obligations with respect to 
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2.4.2 Patentability Criteria and Exemption from Patentability: 
 
The TRIPS Agreement requires that member states grant patents to inventions that meet 
the criteria of novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability.39 Yet innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry as in other technology based sectors has shifted away from the 
premise of absolute novelty towards a situation where innovation is no longer based on 
technological breakthroughs but on the routine exploitation of existing technologies. 
Therefore pharmaceutical companies often make minor improvements to existing drugs 
and identify new uses of known products as a means of extending commercial benefits 
derived from existing products. When patents expire, new patent applications can thus be 
used to prolong market exclusivity.40 
 
Developing countries and LDCs must not fall into the trap of granting patent protection 
for such innovations. There is sufficient scope within the interpretation of the 
patentability criteria of the TRIPS Agreement to exclude such ‘innovations’ from 
protection.  
 
2.4.3 Parallel Iimports and Exhaustion of IPRs: 
 
Due to a wide range of market factors, the price of brand name and generic medicines 
may be lower in one country than the other.41 Thus parallel importation refers to the import 
and resale in a country, without the consent of the patent holder, of a patented product that has 
been legitimately put on the market of the exporting country under a parallel patent. A patent 
                                                                                                                                                 
pharmaceutical products,” 1 July 2002, WTO document IP/C/25 and Council for TRIPS, “Extension of the 
transition period under Article 66.1 for least-developed country Members,” 
30 November 2005, WTO document IP/C/40 
 
39 See, Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
40 See, Carlos M. Correa, "Ownership of Knowledge - The Role of Patents in Pharmaceutical R&D".  
Available at: http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/health.htm. (Last Accessed on 13th January 2007) 
 
41 Tenu Avafia and Savita Mullapudi Narasimahan, ‘The TRIPS Agreement and Access to ARVs’, United 
Nations Development Programme (2006). (Hereinafter, Avafia and Narasimahan). 
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holder may have the exclusive right to manufacture his product and to put it on the market but 
once the product is placed on the market, the principle of exhaustion means that the patent holder 
has no further right over the product. Thus, a patent holder cannot prevent the subsequent resale 
of that product since their rights over the product have been exhausted by the act of selling the 
patented products.42 The flexibility of members to determine their own regimes for 
international exhaustion is enunciated in the TRIPS Agreement and reaffirmed in the 
Doha Declaration.43 
 
2.4.4 Compulsory Licensing and Government Use:  
 
A compulsory license refers to authorization by the State to a third party to exploit a 
patented invention, generally against remuneration to the patent holder.44 The TRIPS 
Agreement does not set out grounds for the grant of a compulsory license leaving 
countries with a large degree of flexibility to determine the grounds based on their public 
health requirements.45 This flexibility has been reaffirmed by the Doha Declaration.46 
 
Government use of patents for public non commercial use is available under the TRIPS 
Agreement. This is similar to compulsory licensing in that it involves the non voluntary 
exploitation of a patented invention against remuneration to the patent holder; the crucial 
difference however is that it does not necessitate negotiation with the patent holder. This 
facilitates more expedient availability of generic equivalents of patented medications.47 
                                                 
42 Vélasquez & Boulet (1999) quoted in Sisule F Musungu and Cecelia Oh, ‘The use of Flexibilities in 
TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can they Promote Access to Medicines?”. Available at: 
http://www.southcentre.org/publications/SouthPerspectiveSeries/TheUseOfFlexibilitiesInTripsFinal.pdf  
(Last Accessed on 13th January 2007) (Hereinafter, Musungu and Oh). 
 
43 See Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement and Paragraph 5(d) of the Doha Declaration. 
 
44  Intellectual Property Rights: Implications for Development: UNCTAD-ICTSD Policy Discussion Paper,    
Chapter 6 Available at: http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd_series/iprs/PP/PP_3CH_06.pdf  (Last Accessed on 
13th January 2007) 
 
45 See, Article 31of the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
46 See paragraph 5(a) of the Doha Declaration. 
  
47 See Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement  
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Thus it can be seen that notwithstanding the success of developed countries in bringing a 
comprehensive agreement on trade related IPRs into the multilateral trade framework, the 
developing countries were able to negotiate these flexibilities into the TRIPS Agreement. 
 
These provisions should be read together with The Doha Declaration of 2001 and the 
TRIPS Council Decision of 2003,48 which clarify and supplement the policy options 
available 
 
                                                 
48 Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on Public Health”.IP/C/W/405 (Aug. 30, 2003), (hereinafter, August 30th 2003 Decision), 
The Doha Declaration and the August 30th 2003 Decision will be discussed at length in Chapter 3  below. 
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3. Chapter 3: Are the TRIPS Flexibilities Sufficient? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned above,49 in the context of patents and public health, the TRIPS Agreement 
is charged with the responsibility of advancing a balance of interests between innovators 
or producers of knowledge in the pharmaceutical sector and users of that knowledge. This 
chapter analyzes the manner in which the TRIPS Agreement attempts to strike that 
balance and concludes by answering the first question posed in the title of the thesis 
regarding the TRIPS flexibilities in the current context, namely, "are they sufficient".  
 
3.2 Pertinent Features of TRIPS that Advance the Interests of 
Producers 
 
3.2.1 Rights Conferred  
 
Article 28 of the TRIPS Agreement is one of the most important provisions for the 
pharmaceutical producers because it is the provision that prescribes the exclusive rights 
that WTO Member states are obliged to confer unto products and processes qualifying for 
patent protection.  
 
The pharmaceutical industry considers the protection of patent rights to be a critical 
precondition for private investment in research and in the development of new drugs. The 
importance of patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry can be attributed to the 
ease with which new chemical entities can be imitated in comparison with the large R&D 
outlays and long product cycles associated with research-based drugs. Thus, the 
                                                 
49 See the section in Chapter one setting out the aims of the study 
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pharmaceutical industry is particularly dependant on the patent system to recoup its R&D 
costs, generate profits and fund further R&D projects.50 
 
The essence of patent rights is thus the exclusion of all forms of competition as noted by 
the Panel in the EC - Canada case.51 The Panel stated as follows: 
 
“The normal practice of exploitation by patent owners, as with owners of any other intellectual 
property right, is to exclude all forms of competition that could detract significantly from the 
economic returns anticipated from a patent’s grant of market exclusivity...” 
 
Article 28.1(a) confers a negative right on the holder of a patent on product to stop all 
third parties who do not have the owner’s consent from making, using, offering for sale, 
selling or importing the said product. 
 
It is important to highlight that with regard to the making of patented pharmaceutical 
products by unauthorized third parties, the exclusive right applies even if an independent 
method or process of producing the product was used. It is also pertinent that it is an 
infringement of this provision for a third party to make a patented product, regardless of 
the purpose of the third party's action.  
 
Under the Paris Convention, the act of importation was not enumerated as an exclusive 
right of the patent.52 Thus, the TRIPS regime grants greater protection with regard to 
pharmaceutical products than existed previously. This is a welcome result for pharma 
because the exclusive rights conferred by TRIPS represent an avenue to exclude 
competition from countries that had created successful pharmaceutical industries by not 
                                                 
50 See, The Final Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights. Available at:  
http://www.iprcommission.org/graphic/documents/final_report.htm. (Last Accessed on 14th May 2007). 
(Hereinafter, IPR Commission, Final Report) , p 34. 
 
51 Canada – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Products WT/DS 114/R (Hereinafter, EC- Canada). 
52 Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, "Intellectual Property Law", Oxford University Press, New York 
(2001), p. 490. 
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adopting product patent regimes and imitating pharmaceuticals originating from 
developed countries.53  
 
The result for IP users is a limitation of their opportunities to import less expensive 
generic copies of pharmaceutical products. This consequence is what necessitated a 
number of developments to try to reconcile exclusive patent rights under TRIPS with the 
public health interest in the developing world. These developments include inter alia, 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration and the ensuing August 30th Decision which will be 
discussed at length below in the current chapter. 
 
It is important to note that in an attempt to consider the interests of the developing world, 
the exclusive right of importation was expressly subjected to the principle of exhaustion 
of IPRs in footnote 6 to Article 28.54  
 
Article 28.1(b) has two parts; the first part confers unto a patentee, the exclusive right to 
use a patented process (method of making a product). The second part grants exclusive 
rights with regard to a product that is directly obtained from a patented process; the said 
exclusive rights include using, offering for sale, selling and importing.  
 
As opposed to patented processes which were generally protected by countries under the 
Paris Convention, the extension of protection to products directly obtained by the 
patented process, as provided for under Article 28.1(b), had not obtained broad 
acceptance before TRIPS. Such extension had been applied in some developed countries, 
often with considerable controversy. The extension was not provided, however, in the 
laws of most developing countries where process patents generally only covered the right 
                                                 
53 See, Chapter 2 above, the section entitled "The Incorporation of IP into the Multilateral Trading System" 
and Peter Drahos, p8.  
 
54 Exhaustion of IPRs will be discussed at length below in the section entitled, "Parallel imports and 
Exhaustion of IPRs". 
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to exclude others from the domestic use of the process, but not to impede the importation 
of products manufactured abroad with the patented process.55 
 
Article 28.1(b) of the TRIPS Agreement addresses an important lacunae for producers as 
without such extension, a process patent granted in country A could not be invoked in 
cases where the patented process has been utilized in country B and the resulting product 
is imported into country A. The extension of the protection to the product obtained 
directly by the patented process addresses this problem. 
 
The extension of rights to cover products directly obtained by a patented process is 
greatly strengthened when read together with Article Art 34.1 of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Article 34.1 obliges members to empower their judiciary to reverse the legal burden of 
proof in civil proceedings concerning infringement of Article 28.1(b) from the patentee 
(he who asserts) to the alleged infringer. I.e. the alleged infringer can be ordered to prove 
that the process used is different from the patented process. 
 
Shifting the evidential burden strengthens the rights conferred with regard to a product 
directly obtained from a patented process because proving that a product is directly 
obtained by a patented process may not be a simple matter. This is evident when one 
considers that Article 28.1(b) applies when a product has been directly obtained by the 
patented process, and not merely when it is obtainable by it. The difference is important, 
since in the chemical sector the same product may, in many cases, be obtained through 
different processes and it may thus be difficult for the patentee to prove whether a 
product has been directly obtained by his patented process.56 
 
Article 33 of the TRIPS Agreement provides that the exclusive rights conferred on a 
patentee must not end before twenty years from the date of filing. This principle has been 
                                                 
55  UNCTAD-ICTSD, "Resource Book on TRIPS and Development" Available at: 
www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/ResourceBookIndex.htm (Last Accessed on 20th May 2007). (Hereinafter 
ICTSD Resource Book), p 421. 
 
56 Ibid. 
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underpinned by the WTO Panel in the Canada -Term of Patent Protection case,57 where 
the panel dismissed Canada’s attempts to legitimize patent laws that conferred a period of 
effective exclusive rights for a period less than twenty years.58 
  
3.2.2 Non Discrimination 
 
The second portion of Article 27.1 is known as the “non discrimination” clause. It forbids 
WTO Member states from discriminating in terms of availability or length of patent 
protection based on the place of the invention, the field of technology or whether the 
products are imported or locally produced. 
 
The Paris Convention contained no equivalent to the non discrimination clause. Parties to 
the Convention could accordingly discriminate with regard to patentability based on 
whatever grounds were deemed in accordance with their national interests. As a result, 
before the TRIPS Agreement, more than fifty countries including India did not grant 
patent protection for pharmaceutical products.59Article 27.1 erased this flexibility. 
 
It was expressly permissible under the Paris Convention to grant a compulsory license 
and thus inhibit a patentee’s exclusive rights on the basis of the patent having not been 
worked locally, that is, if the patented product was not produced domestically. The 
TRIPS regime is less clear as to the consistency of compulsory licenses on the grounds of 
failure to work locally with the non discrimination clause. An example of a patent regime 
with non working as a ground for compulsory licensing is Brazil’s 1996 Industrial 
Property Act which stipulates that a patent shall be subject to compulsory licensing if the 
patent is not worked in the territory of Brazil.60  
                                                 
57 Canada- Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS170/AB/R (Report of the Appellate Body) (Hereinafter 
Canada- Term of Patent Protection). 
 
58 See, Canada-Term of Patent Protection, para103. 
 
59 ICTSD Resource Book. p 370. 
 
60 Anna Lanoszka, “The Global Politics of Intellectual Property Rights and Pharmaceutical Drug Policies 
in Developing Countries”, p 10. Available at http://ips.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/24/2/181 (Last accessed on 
19th February 2007). 
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This Brazilian provision would have been expressly permissible under the Paris 
Convention but it was challenged under the TRIPS regime by the US and EU under the 
DSU. In settlement, Brazil agreed to a deal in which it would consult with the US before 
issuing a compulsory license for a product patented by a US company. This is a 
considerable limitation of Brazil’s ability to determine its own national policy in favor of 
the protection of the interests of US pharmaceuticals brought about by the non 
discrimination clause of TRIPS as opposed to the previous lack of such restriction.  
 
There is however, a strong case to argue that a failure of local working ground is TRIPS 
compliant. Three arguments to that effect follow below: 
 
First, paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration expressly confirms what was already 
evident from Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, that WTO Members are free to 
determine the grounds for issuing compulsory licenses. 
 
The second argument is that in the EC-Canada case,61 the Panel distinguished between 
discrimination and differentiation made for bona fide purposes. The Panel made it clear 
that the conduct prohibited in Article 27.1 is discrimination while differentiation for bona 
fide purposes is permitted. Thus there is a strong case to argue that a local working 
requirement backed by the threat of non voluntary use is a differentiation for a bona fide 
purpose, namely, facilitating the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive 
to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations as envisaged by 
the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement as set out in Article 7. 
 
Finally, although the Panel accepted the presumption of EC and Canada that non 
discrimination applies to non voluntary use, it can be argued that this presumption was 
accepted in the context of the Panel interpreting Article 30 and that Article 27.1 deals 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
61 EC- Canada. 
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with patentability requirements while non voluntary use is subject to Article 31, a self 
standing Article. As such the non discrimination clause does not apply to compulsory 
licenses.62 
 
Moreover, the decision of the US to not pursue the case can be regarded as indicating the 
weakness of its claim against Brazil. 
 
The non discrimination clause is fundamental to the interests of the industrialized 
countries and pharma as it allows them to invest in developing countries and LDCs 
without the fear that their patents would be targeted for discriminatory treatment. Another 
crucial effect of the provision is that it achieves one of the main objectives that 
industrialized countries had when they sought to place IP within the multilateral trading 
system, namely the ability to trade rather than diffuse their technology through relief 
from the obligation to exploit patents locally (although this may be limited by local 
working requirements).63  
 
For the developing world, this has an adverse impact on their interest in the transfer of 
technology. The provision also has the effect of obliging them to accord the same level of 
protection for inventions in terms of duration and effect to inventions that make different 
contributions, some of them significant and some less so.64 
 
3.2.3 Mailbox and EMRs 
 
From the perspective of pharma, duly represented by industrialized governments at the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, there needed to be a mechanism to protect their interests 
                                                 
62 ICTSD Resource Book, Page 423. 
 
63 See, Chap 2 above, the section entitled, “The Incorporation of IP into the Multilateral Trading System”. 
 
64 See, Lester Thurow, “Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights”,  Harvard Business 
Review, September – October: 1997, quoted in ICTSD Resource Book, p 424. 
 
 33
during the transition periods.65 Therefore, industrialized Members pushed for and 
succeeded in attaining the inclusion of Articles 70.8 and 70.9.  
 
Developing countries were of greater concern to pharma’s interests than LDCs which 
generally lacked pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity and thus significant potential to 
pose a threat to pharma’s commercial interests. There was however, the possibility that 
LDCs could develop manufacturing capacities during the course of the transition 
period.66 Thus the applicability of Articles 70.8 and 70.9 to LDCs was necessary from the 
perspective of pharma and thus industrialized countries. 
 
Article 70.8(a) obliges countries availing themselves of a transition period to provide a 
means by which patent applications can be filed i.e., a receiving point where such 
applications can be recorded and stored. Such a receiving point is commonly referred to 
as a “mailbox”. 
 
According to Article 70.8(b), countries must apply to those applications, the criteria for 
patentability laid down in Article 27.1 as if those criteria are being applied on the date of 
filing in that member or where priority is available or claimed, on the priority date of the 
application.67  
 
Article 70.8(b) is thus very important from the perspective of pharmaceutical producers 
in that it mandates the application of a priority date or in the absence thereof, a filing date 
                                                 
65 See,  Chapter 2 and the section on transition periods below. 
 
66 As noted above, the stated purpose of the transition period is to facilitate LDC efforts to develop a 
technological base, it is neither logical nor intended by the wording of TRIPS to exclude developing a 
technological base in the pharmaceutical industry from this objective. 
 
67 See Article 70(8) (b). Reference to the concept of priority in patent law makes Article 4 of the Paris 
Convention applicable to TRIPS. Under this doctrine, when a patent application is first filed in a member 
country of the Paris Union, the applicant thereby secures a priority date. From this priority date, a one-year 
period is counted during which that applicant may file in other countries of the Paris Union and such 
applications “shall not be invalidated by any acts accomplished in the interval, in particular, another filing, 
the publication or exploitation of the invention, and such acts cannot give rise to any third party right or any 
right of personal possession.” 
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for patent applications that must be used as a benchmark from which time to asses 
patentability of subject matter in the mailbox.  
 
Hence the effect of this provision is to prevent a situation where subject matter that is not 
patentable during a transition period could never be patentable when transition periods 
expire. Publication of the patent application in a foreign country or domestic availability 
of the product (at least one of these ‘acts’ inevitable during the transition period) would 
negate the novelty of the subject matter. This effect is achieved through the requirement 
that the examiner of the patent considers the state of knowledge as it existed as of the 
initial filing or priority date. 
 
Article 70.8(c) requires that when the transition period expires, members are to grant 
patent protection for products successfully assessed under Article 70.8(b) for the 
remainder of the twenty year term of protection mandated in Article 33 counted from the 
date of filing in the member processing the application.  
                                                                                                                                                     
Article 70.9 obliges Members to provide exclusive marketing rights EMRs to subject 
matter which is subject to a patent application under Article 70.8(a). The EMRs must 
subsist for a period of five years after obtaining marketing approval in that member or 
until the Article 70.8 application results in a product patent being granted or rejected in 
that member, which ever period is shorter. This obligation is subject to the condition that 
a product patent must have been filed and granted in another member and marketing 
approval attained in that other member. 
 
EMR is an ambiguous concept left undefined by the TRIPS Agreement and without 
precedent in most domestic legislation. The inclusion of EMRs in the final TRIPS 
package was regarded as a compromise between countries with an interest in early patent 
protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products and countries that 
sought a transition period for those products.68  
                                                 
68 ICTSD Resource Book, p760. 
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The term EMRs may be ambiguous but what is clear about the term is that it does not 
provide patent rights. Patent rights are clearly defined in Article 28 as allowing the patent 
holder to prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing 
the product covered by the patent.  
 
In contrast, EMRs do not apply to acts of making the product, they apply only to 
marketing the product. This means, the acts a business enterprise undertakes in 
connection with selling products that are already manufactured.69 Therefore, the holder of 
the patent application may not prevent third parties from producing the product within the 
territory of the Member, but may prevent third parties from advertising, offering or 
selling the product to a person other than the patent applicant. 
 
Since EMRs under Article 70.9 do not purport to restrict the ability of generic producers 
to make alternatives to brand pharmaceutical products, one could argue that the 
availability of those generic alternatives to the public is preserved. 
 
The reality however is that granting EMRs to brand producers can be just as obstructive 
to the public’s interest in affordable medicines (possibly more so) than patent rights. This 
is because allowing generic competitors to make a medicine which is subject to a mailbox 
application can not benefit the public if the producer of the generic medicine is unable to 
sell the same. In addition, EMRs are not IPRs and are therefore not subject to compulsory 
licensing. EMRs are thus a significant barrier to generic competition entering the market 
during the period of market exclusivity.  
 
Furthermore, the five year period prescribed for the EMRs after attaining marketing 
approval (if the patent assessment takes longer than marketing approval) is a period 
significant enough for a brand producer to establish a virtual monopoly by employing 
vigorous, well funded and unchallenged marketing campaigns that may prove impossible 
                                                 
69 Ibid, p775. 
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for generic competitors with smaller advertising budgets to emulate upon the conclusion 
of market exclusivity. 
 
Therefore, the obligation that EMRs be granted in countries not applying pharmaceutical 
patent protection pursuant to a transition period secured the interests of pharma by 
granting their products a sui geniris mode of protection in the absence of patent rights.  
 
Obliging LDCs to grant EMRs would frustrate whatever benefits the LDCs could derive 
out of being exempted from the obligation to grant product patens for pharmaceuticals 
and thus the purpose of the transition period. 70 It was in this context that the General 
Council agreed to the recommendation of the TRIPS Council in 2002 to grant a waiver of 
the obligation in Article 70.9 for LDCs with respect to pharmaceutical products until 1 
January 2016. 
 
Mailbox protection and EMRs secure the interests of industrialized countries and pharma 
by placing a time cap on originators’ inability to enjoy patent protection in countries 
taking advantage of transitions periods. This can have huge implications for access to 
medicines in developing countries and LDCs alike.  
 
3.2.4 Enforcement and Related Obligations Consolidating the Patent Holder’s Rights 
 
Finally, Article 41.1 requires WTO Members to “... ensure that enforcement procedures 
... are available under their national laws so as to permit effective action against any act 
of infringement of IPRs ...” Article 62.2 obliges members to “... ensure that the 
procedures for grant or registration ... permit the granting or registration of the right 
                                                 
70 This is something the TRIPS Council recognized in the Decision on Least-Developed Country Members’ 
Obligations Under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WTO 
Document WT/L/478,(Hereinafter, Article 70.9 waiver).In this decision, the TRIPS Council in the 
introductory paragraphs considered “that obligations under paragraph 9 of Article 70 of the TRIPS 
Agreement, where applicable, should not prevent attainment of the objectives of paragraph 7 of the 
Declaration”. Both the Decision on Article 70.9 and paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration are to be 
discussed in detail below.  
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within a reasonable period of time so as to avoid unwarranted curtailment of the period of 
protection.” 
 
3.3 The Effect of Protecting Producer Interests on Access to 
Medicines in the Developing World 
 
The above provisions relating to the rights conferred unto a patentee; non discrimination; 
mailbox and EMRs; and enforcement related obligations represent the most extensive and 
comprehensive patent protection to be granted to pharmaceutical producers. As a result of 
these provisions, their interests are secured to the extent of conferring a minimum twenty 
year monopoly (even longer through the operation of EMRs and where a national patent 
system allows ever greening through incremental inventions).71  
 
The monopoly position allows pharmaceuticals to charge prices well above the marginal 
cost of production. In a competitive market, a producer cannot for a sustained period of 
time charge a price for a product significantly over the marginal cost of production because 
this encourages new producers to enter the market, eventually bringing down the price of 
the product. By charging high prices in a competitive market, a producer undermines 
its own long-term well-being by encouraging additional supply from new market 
entrants.72 This natural economic barrier to high prices is eliminated by the pharmaceutical 
patentee’s ability to exclude competition (particularly generic competition). 
 
What effect do increased prices facilitated by pharmaceutical patents have on the interests 
of the developing world in terms of access to medicines?  
 
This debate has been ongoing for some time. Pharmaceutical producers represented by 
the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA) 
backed by industrialized countries, particularly the US, maintain that the exclusive rights 
                                                 
71 The concept of ever greening is discussed below in the section on the Article 27.1 patentability criteria. 
 
72 See, Abbott (2001), Annex A. 
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conferred by TRIPS with regard to pharmaceutical patents do not adversely affect access 
to essential medicines in the developing world.73 On the other hand, stakeholders in 
developing countries and LDCs argue the opposite. 
 
The notion that the patent protection conferred unto pharmaceuticals under the TRIPS 
regime does not impede access to medicines in the developing world is based on the 
following arguments: 
 
Regarding access to existing medicines, price is but one of the factors that influence 
access in the developing world along with healthcare infrastructure to support delivery. 
Therefore the reduction of prices is unlikely to increase access to essential existing 
medicines. An example of this line of argument can be extracted from the US 
intervention during a meeting of the TRIPS Council. The US delegation was of the 
following view: 
 
“..The cost of drugs is only one of many important issues that must be addressed in any health 
crises….“We must recognize that even if enough drugs to treat every single HIV-positive person 
were provided, free of charge, an adequate infrastructure to deliver them and monitor their use 
does not appear to exist in many areas most in need…”.74 
 
It is indeed true that healthcare infrastructure is one of the factors affecting access to 
essential medicines in the developing world; however, price is an inescapably crucial 
factor. This because inter alia, most poor people in developing countries pay for their 
own drugs and state provision is normally selective and resource-constrained.  This is 
generally not the case in the developed world where costs are mainly met by the state or 
through insurance schemes.75  
 
                                                 
73 For example, Harvey Bale, director general of the IFPMA, said “…Access to medicines isn't about 
patents, but about investing in health services so the drugs get to the people that need them,”, See IAC 
(SM) Newsletter Database, July 2, 2001, quoted in  Abbott (2001). 
 
74 See, Abbott (2001), Annex A. 
 
75UK IPR Commission, Final Report, p 35. 
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To say that price does not affect access to medicines is to argue that lowering the price of 
those products will not bring additional consumers to the market and thus amounts to a 
denial of the laws of supply and demand. It is undeniable that for those with limited 
resources, the ability to enter the market is strictly determined by price. As the price of the 
life-saving pharmaceutical decreases, all potential consumers with adequate resources will 
purchase it, or otherwise die.76 Hence, to say that there are other factors affecting access to 
medicines is not an adequate argument to justify the assertion a highly inhibitive factor is not 
an issue.  
  
The second argument against patents having an inhibitive effect on access to medicines in 
the developing world pertains to medicines that are not yet in existence but are to be 
invented in future. The argument espouses that protection of patent rights is a critical 
incentive for private investment in pharmaceutical research and in the development of 
new drugs that are used to treat diseases in the developing world. The twenty year 
monopoly rights conferred thus reward innovators for costs incurred in the course of 
R&D to develop the drugs. 
 
This argument thus has 2 tiers, the first tier being that patent rights are an incentive to 
innovation of drugs to treat diseases in the developing world; while the second tier 
considers that the monopoly rights are fair compensation for R&D costs incurred. 
 
The first tier is flawed in that patent protection offers little incentive for research on 
diseases that disproportionately affect developing countries due to the absence of a 
significant market.77 There is a plethora of evidence to this end. For instance in 2002, it 
was estimated that 5% of money spent worldwide on pharmaceutical R&D was for 
diseases that predominantly affect developing countries.78 Even HIV vaccine research is 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
 
77See, Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (2001), Final Report, p77. and Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and  Public Health (CIPIH(2006)), Final Report,  p 12  
 
78 UK IPR Commission, Final Report, p37.  
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targeted at subtype B of the virus which is prevalent in developed countries as opposed to 
subtype A and C which are prevalent in developing countries.79  
 
This dialectic in pharmaceutical research patterns is a consequence of the nonexistence of 
commercial incentive for the private sector which dominates pharmaceutical R&D to 
undertake research of specific relevance to the majority of poor people living in low 
income countries regardless of patent protection prevailing in those countries.80 
Therefore the incentive for R&D into developing world diseases is unaffected by the 
presence or lack of IP protection, the only relevant factor is whether there is a market 
demand sufficient to induce pharmaceuticals to commit their resources to research. 
 
The final argument advanced in this context is that the monopoly provided by patent 
rights is necessary to compensate innovators for the costs incurred in pharmaceutical 
R&D because recovering the expenditures would not be possible if competitors were 
allowed to copy and profit from the innovations without incurring similar costs.81 This 
reasoning is prima facie logical and fair as indeed there are significant costs involved in 
developing drugs especially where there is no predecessor of the drug on which to base 
research and a high level of innovation is thus required. 
 
A deeper perusal of this argument however reveals that granting a patent monopoly is a 
very imprecise instrument for achieving this objective because there is no direct correlation 
between the income obtained from the patent and the amount of R&D undertaken. A research 
company may spend very little to develop an important new drug if for example, they rely on 
the work of a university laboratory or operate under a government subsidy, but the company  
may nonetheless charge a substantial price for the drug. The result is that, pharmaceutical 
companies spend approximately 15% of their revenue on R&D while a much larger portion 
                                                 
79 Ibid. 
 
80 CIPIH (2006), Final Report, p 12. 
 
81 For instance, the panel in the EC-Canada case opined that, “. . . Patent laws establish a carefully defined 
period of market exclusivity … and the policy of those laws cannot be achieved unless patent owners are 
permitted to take effective advantage of that inducement once it has been defined.” See WT/DS/114/R, 
para. 7.55. 
 
 41
goes to other costs such as administration, advertising and promotion, yet these other costs 
are also covered by patent rents.82 
 
The lack of direct correlation between research expenditures and patent-based income has 
become more significant under TRIPS as R &D conducted in a single country can today be 
exploited by an effectively worldwide patent, so that income to the patent holder is generated 
from a far larger consumer base than was formerly possible.83 
 
These arguments attempt to evidence a bargain with society whereby the benefits to society 
generated by the extra innovation induced (for example, a lifesaving drug which might 
not exist but for the patent system) exceed the extra cost of the product. The problem 
with this concept however is that if the cost prohibits the public in the developing world 
from enjoying the benefit and if the innovation generated does not address diseases 
affecting the developing world then surely the preponderance of interests promoted by 
the conferment of the above rights in the context of our discussion rests squarely with the 
patent holding producers of pharmaceutical technology. Thus, to quote Kieth Maskus:84  
 
“…the preponderance of conclusions is pessimistic about the net effects of dug patents on 
the economic welfare of developing countries”.85   
 
3.4 The Interests of Users: Striking a Balance 
 
                                                 
82 Marcia  Angell, "The Truth About  the Drug Companies: How They  Deceive US and What to Do About 
It", New England Journal of Medicine, (2004), quoted in Frederick M. Abbott, “The WTO Medicines 
Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health”, American Journal of 
International Law (2005) 99. 317-58.(Hereinafter, Abbott, The Medicines Decision) 
 
83 See, Abbott (2001), p 41 
 
84 Maskus is a world renowned economist, while Abbott and Correa are leaders as far as the legal aspects of 
IP/Public health are concerned; they rely heavily on Maskus for the economic analysis. 
 
85 Keith Maskus, “Intellectual Property Rights and the Global Economy”, Institute for International 
Economics (2000), p 160.  
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How then does the TRIPS Agreement attempt to reconcile the above monopoly rights 
conferred unto the producers of pharmaceutical technology with the public health interest 
of developing countries and LDCs? The answer lies in the TRIPS flexibilities. 
 
3.4.1 The Legal Derivatives of the TRIPS Flexibilities 
 
The TRIPS flexibilities result from the language of Article 1.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 
which provides that “Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of 
implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and 
practice”. WTO Members can thus exploit creative solutions to transpose into national 
law and practice those concepts that the TRIPS Agreement simply enunciates but does 
not define.86  
 
The flexibilities also result from the objectives and principles of the TRIPS Agreement 
enumerated in Article 7 and 8 which refer respectively to IPRs being enforced in a 
manner that contributes to “social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations” as well as the ability of Members while formulating their laws to, “adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological 
development”. The TRIPS Agreement must be interpreted in light of Articles 7 and 8 
according to the international laws of Treaty interpretation.87  
 
The examples of those flexibilities to be discussed in this chapter include: transition 
periods, the patentability criteria and exemption from patentability; parallel importation; 
                                                 
86 See, “Advice on Flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement”. Available at: http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/legislative_assistance/advice_trips.html  
 
87 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that, “a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of object and purpose”. 
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as well as compulsory licenses and government use. These flexibilities were 
supplemented by the Doha Declaration and subsequent developments in the WTO.88  
 
From the perspective of developing countries attempting to promote their public health 
interests, the Doha Declaration was crucial in that it confirmed the right of Members to 
use the flexibility within TRIPS to interpret and implement their obligations in a manner 
consistent with those interests. To this end, the essence of the Doha Declaration is 
captured in paragraph 4 which reads as follows: 
 
“We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking 
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS 
Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a 
manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote 
access to medicines for all.  
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the full, the provisions in the 
TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose".  
 
3.4.2 The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration 
 
The first two words of paragraph 4 are expressed in the form of an agreement (“we 
agree”). Since the statement was adopted by consensus of the Ministers and the operative 
language is in the form of an agreement, there is a consensus amongst the leading 
scholars that this constitutes a Decision under Article IX: 1 of the WTO Agreement. The 
Doha Declaration thus has legal effects on WTO Members and institutional bodies, 
particularly the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the TRIPS Council.89 This is 
evidenced by the fact that the TRIPS Council has taken actions, subsequently borne out 
by the General Council on the direct instructions of the Doha Declaration. Take for 
                                                 
88 Council for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights “Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the 
Doha Declaration on Public Health”.IP/C/W/405 (Aug. 30, 2003), (hereinafter, August 30th 2003 Decision), 
and The Decision on the Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/41 (Dec. 6, 2005), (hereinafter, The 
2005 Amendment Decision). 
 
89 See, Carlos M. Correa, “Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health”, p 44, University of Buenos Aires, (2002), (hereinafter, Correa (2002)) and Abbott, “Lighting a 
Dark Corner”, p 491. 
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instance the negotiations and decisions taken to implement paragraph 6 and 7 of the Doha 
Declaration, both of which will be discussed below in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
These actions are also in accordance with the Final Act under which Members agreed to 
adopt Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.90 
 
The Doha Declaration is not strictly an authoritative interpretation in terms of Article 
IX.2 of the WTO Agreement; however, given the content and mode of approval of the 
Doha Declaration, it can be argued that it has the same effect as an authoritative 
interpretation.91 
  
In addition, the Doha Declaration is part of the context of the TRIPS Agreement, which, 
according to the rules of treaty interpretation,92 has to be taken into account when 
interpreting the Agreement. Moreover, the Doha Declaration can be regarded as a 
“subsequent agreement” between the parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty or the 
application of its provisions, under Article 31.3 (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of the Treaties. 
 
What can be concluded in practical terms about the Doha Declaration’s utility for 
Members wishing to rely on its provisions? In answer to this question it is appropriate to 
quote Professor Correa who opines inter alia as follows: 
 
The confirmation [by the Doha Declaration] that the TRIPS Agreement has left room for 
flexibility at the national level has important political and legal implications. It indicates that the 
pressures to impede the use of available flexibilities run counter to the spirit and 
purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. In legal terms, it means that panels and the 
              Appellate Body must interpret the Agreement and the laws and regulations adopted 
                                                 
90 See, Article 2(b) of the Final Act Embodying the  Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations. 
 
91 See, Article IX.1 of the WTO Agreement and Carlos M Correa, “Implications of the Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health”, p 44, University of Buenos Aires, (2002). (Hereinafter, 
Correa (2002)).  
 
92 See Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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to implement it in light of the public health needs of individual Members.93 
 
3.5 The TRIPS Flexibilities: A Critical Analysis 
 
The remainder of the chapter will be dedicated to a critique of selected flexibilities.94 The 
critique will be undertaken with a view to ascertaining as the title of this paper mandates, 
whether or not the TRIPS flexibilities are sufficient to balance the interests of IP 
producers and users as envisaged in the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement. It looks 
specifically in the domain of public health.   
 
3.5.1 Transition Periods 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, a transition period can basically be defined as the 
period of time considered necessary and thus granted for a WTO member to bring itself 
into conformity with its obligations under a WTO agreement. 
 
Transition periods were a new feature of the final package of agreements concluded at the 
Uruguay Round and are without parallel under the GATT 1947 regime. This has been 
attributed to the fact that the GATT was mainly about tariff reduction which has 
considerably less effect on a country’s internal legal system than the minimum standards, 
border controls and enforcement procedures required by the TRIPS regime.95  
 
Transition periods were among the few concessions made by industrialized countries that 
sought to secure the interests of pharma at the Uruguay Round, TRIPS negotiations.96 
They were seen as necessary to bring on board developing countries whose assessment of 
                                                 
93 See, Correa (2002), p vii. 
 
94 See, Chapter 2 above for a list of the flexibilities to be tackled. 
 
95 ICTSD Resource Book, p 706. 
 
96 See, Chapter 2 above, the section entitled, "The Incorporation of IP into the Multilateral Trading 
System". 
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the issue concluded that to standardize protection at advanced levels is to erroneously 
presume that each economy has in place a technological or creative infrastructure for 
which high protection would be beneficial.97 These countries also considered that the 
GATT did not mandate uniform levels of trade protection and thus to do so in TRIPS 
would be inconsistent and excessive.98 Furthermore, the concession was necessary 
because these countries had initially been vehemently opposed to the introduction of IP 
into the round and remained skeptical throughout.99 
 
The transition periods are a form of special and differential treatment (SDT). SDT in the 
GATT/WTO is based on the idea that developing countries are inherently disadvantaged 
in their participation in international trade for a variety of reasons such as institutional 
weakness, technological barriers, supply side constraints etc. It is for this reason the 
international community has agreed that, in principle, developing countries should be 
subject to somewhat different rules and disciplines in international trade than those that 
apply to developed countries; and that the latter will implement their obligations under 
the GATT and WTO in ways that would be favourable to development.100 
 
Of the transition periods agreed at the Uruguay Round, Article 66.1 which applies to 
LDCs will form the basis for the preponderant portion of this section. The reason being 
that it is one of only two transition periods that relate specifically to pharmaceutical 
product patent protection in developing countries and unlike its counterpart,101 the Article 
                                                 
97 Keith Maskus, “Intellectual Property Rights and the Global Economy”, Institute for International 
Economics (2000), p6. 
 
98 Ibid.  
 
99  See, Chapter 2 above, the section entitled, "The Incorporation of IP into the Multilateral Trading 
System". See, also ICTSD Resource Book p 707.  
 
100 This principle was introduced into the GATT via the 1979 “Enabling Resolution” .  
See, Constantine Michalopoulos, "Special and Differential Treatment of Developing Countries in TRIPS", 
Available at : http://www.qiap.ca/documents/DT(US)1.pdf (Last Accessed on 23rd March 2007). 
(Hereinafter, Michalopoulos), p4.   
 
101 The other provision in question is Article 65.4 which grants developing countries which had not 
previously provided pharmaceutical patent protection 
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66.1 transition period still applies. The transition period remains effective due to an 
extension adopted pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration. 102  
 
Upon a reading of Article 66.1 in the context of SDT it is a apparent that although 
financial and administrative constraints for the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement 
are a component of the rationale for Article 66.1, the particular requirements of LDCs 
and their need for flexibility to create a viable technological base clearly constitute the 
central objective of the provision. Article 66.1 aims to provide LDCs not merely with 
time to comply, but with time to develop their technological base (including 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity), national policies and economies to ensure that 
the eventual application of the patent protection provided for by the TRIPS Agreement 
will promote rather than undermine their socio - economic well-being.103  
 
The inclusion of an extension of the Article 66.1 transition period in the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and public health demonstrates the WTO Members’ intention that 
the transition period should assist LDCs in their efforts to promote access to affordable 
medicines. Thus it is necessary in this section to consider whether this form of SDT can 
indeed assist LDCs to establish a viable technological base that can assist them to access 
affordable medicines. 
 
The transition period and its’ subsequent extension remove until 2016 any barriers that 
pharmaceutical product patents may impose on the ability of LDCs to produce, import 
and export medicines among themselves. Realistically however, the utilization of this 
                                                 
102 Decision of the Council for TRIPS on the Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to 
Pharmaceutical Products, IP/C/25 of 27 June 2002 and   The Doha Ministerial Conference, “Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,” 20 November 2001, WTO document WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 
paragraph 7  respectively. The extension relieves LDCs of the obligation to provide pharmaceutical patent 
or test data protection until 2016. The decision was adopted in accordance with the ministerial instruction 
to the TRIPS council in paragraph 7 of the Doha Declaration. 
 
103 South Centre – CIEL, IP quarterly Update First Quarter 2006, p2. Available at: 
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/IP_Update_1Q06.pdf (Last Accessed on 23rd March 2007). 
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opportunity can only occur if LDCs improve their technological base and develop 
capacity for the production of generic medicines.104 
 
Pursuant to Article 65.4 of the TRIPS Agreement, certain developing countries did not 
have the obligation to provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products until 2005. 
These countries, particularly India with its immense generic industry thus constituted a 
viable source of affordable generic medicines to LDCs wishing to import cheaper generic 
medicines. This is because as there was no obligation under the TRIPS Agreement to 
negotiate a voluntary license with the patent holder or to issue a compulsory license 
either on the export or the import side.  
 
Thus the only off patent medicines currently available to LDCs from non LDC Members 
are those that have that status because the patent on them has expired. Medicines in this 
already limited category are further limited due to ever greening by brand pharmaceutical 
firms.105  
 
It should be noted that in any event, the option to import medicines on which the patent 
has expired is available to LDCs independently of the transition period assuming they are 
off patent on both the export and import side. Thus in the absence of LDCs finding means 
to utilize the transition period to develop a viable technological base and establish 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, the effect of the transition period as it is on 
access to medicines will remain as is, insignificant. 
 
In reality the Article 66.1 transition period is not a real concession but rather it is a form 
of second best SDT notwithstanding the 2002 extension and the 70.9 waiver.106 
Developed countries agreed to the transition period in large part because LDCs have 
limited purchasing power and thus do not constitute market for their products significant 
enough to warrant extensively protecting. In addition, LDCs generally have no 
                                                 
104 Abbott, Lighting a Dark Corner, p503. 
 
105 See the section entitled "The Patentability Criteria and Exemption from Patentability" below for an 
explanation and discussion of ever greening. 
106 See, Michalopoulos. p14. 
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pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity hence the threat of generic industries in those 
countries emerging to rival brand pharmaceuticals is low. 
 
It would be too categorical a criticism to describe the transition period as second best 
SDT without substantiation on its’ demerits, therefore the reasons why it is so billed are 
explained below. 
 
First, the transition period was chosen without any serious analysis of the time and 
resources required for establishing the necessary institutional capacity this is evidenced 
by the need to extend the LDC transition period from 2006 until 2016 with regard to 
pharmaceutical products and 2013 with regard to general obligations in 2002 and 2005 
respectively. 
 
Secondly, the problems faced by other small and low income countries in implementing 
TRIPS obligations are similar to those faced by LDCs. Those developing countries 
should at least have been included in the extension to 2016 provided to the LDCs.107  
A proposed solution to this anomaly is that GDP per capita should be used as a criteria to 
expand the list of countries that qualify for SDT.108  
 
Thirdly, a meaningful SDT provision should permit all developing countries, or at least 
the LDCs and other low income developing countries to decide which sectors of their 
economy to include for patenting and the length of the period for which patents would be 
provided as opposed to the current questionable transition period. This would be 
consistent with the development view that different levels and degrees of IPR protection 
are appropriate at different levels of development. Such an SDT provision would 
drastically change the meaning of the TRIPS regime and make it more development 
                                                 
107 Ibid. 
 
108 A country like Bangladesh with DGP per capita of $2,200 as of 2006 qualifies for the transition period 
whereas Zimbabwe with a lesser GDP per capita of $2,000 as of the same year does not qualify under the 
current criteria,  
See The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)World Fact Book, Available at: 
https://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gh.html (Last Accessed on 25th March 2007). 
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friendly by meaningfully considering the interests of the world’s poorest nations in the 
balancing act attempted by the TRIPS Agreement.109  
 
Given the time constraints and difficulties associated with the Doha mandate however, it 
will be extremely difficult to renegotiate the Agreement in this direction at present. Thus, 
it may be necessary for developing countries to resort to what in a sense are ‘second best’ 
SDT provisions that merely have the effect of delaying for as long as possible the 
obligation to fully implement the TRIPS Agreement.110 
 
Moreover, the transition period does not address the real problem of access to medicines 
in LDCs which is lack of pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity exacerbated by a lack 
of ability to import expensive patented medicines. This problem is more acute in LDCs 
than even other developing countries. 
 
If the transition period could incorporate a mechanism to assist LDCs to develop a viable 
technological base so as to allow them to create pharmaceutical manufacturing 
capacity,111 then indeed the transition period could be regarded as genuinely assisting 
LDCs to facilitate access to medicines. The Integrated Framework for Trade-Related 
Technical Assistance to LDCs (IF),112 is a possible avenue from which LDCs could 
pursue that end.113  
   
                                                 
109 See, Michalopoulos, p13. 
 
110 Ibid. 
 
111 This was requested by Zambia on behalf of LDCs when making their request for a fifteen year extension 
which resulted in the seven an a half year general TRIPS extension of 2005 which is due to expire in 2013 
See, Transition Period for Least Developed Countries; Request for Extension, WTO document IP/C/W/457 
 
112 The IF is an international initiative through which the IMF, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, the World Bank 
and the WTO combine their efforts with those of LDCs, donors and other development partners to respond 
to the trade development needs of LDCs. 
 
113 See, WTO Committee on Trade and Development, Technical Assistance and Training Plan 2007, WTO 
Document WT/COMTD/W/151. 
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The transition period is still of questionable benefit to LDCs in terms of the importation 
of generic medicines because on the exporter side, Article 31(f) exacerbated by recent 
Indian pharmaceutical product patent protection, inhibits LDCs’ ability to import 
necessary drugs.114 Furthermore, as alluded to above, the availability of off patent 
medicines is independent of the transition period.  
 
The real solution for access to medicines in LDCs is for those countries to develop 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. In the absence thereof, they should mitigate the 
difficulties caused by lack of pharmaceutical manufacturing by making use of other 
TRIPS flexibilities. Otherwise LDCs run the risk of the transition period remaining no 
more than an extension of time as opposed to an instrument to facilitate achieving their 
development objectives within the IP system including greater access to affordable 
medicines. 
 
3.5.2 The Patentability Criteria and Exemption from Patentability 
 
The first portion of Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement sets out the conditions which 
form the criteria for patentability. It is a good example of the uneasy balance that exists 
inherently within the TRIPS Agreement between the interests of producers and users. It 
explicitly creates enforceable rights for producers while leaving users (and producers) 
with considerable flexibility in terms of their interpretation and implementation. 
 
The portion of Article 27.1 relevant to the current discussion reads as follows: 
 
‘… patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application…’ 
 
                                                 
114 It is important to note that the August 3Oth 2003 Decision and the TRIPS Amendment adopted in 
pursuance thereof attempt to mitigate this problem. The extent to which that end is achieved will be the 
subject of detailed discussion in the section dealing with compulsory licensing below. 
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According to Article 27.1, the legal framework within a Member must grant patent 
protection upon application to any invention that is novel, involves an inventive step, and 
is capable of industrial application.  
 
Footnote 5 to Article 27.1 allows for ‘inventive step’ and ‘industrial applicability’ to be 
interpreted as being synonymous with the lower benchmarks of non obvious and useful 
respectively.   
 
The interpretation of the patentability criteria is left open to Members. Thus countries are 
free to interpret the various terms depending on their own national interests.  
 
The US, Japan and a few Western European countries produce the majority of 
internationally marketable products and technologies and thus have commensurate IP 
laws aimed at protecting these inventions.115 The flexibility in Article 27.1 means that 
producer countries which have an interest that is pro protection can interpret the 
patentability criteria to allow the patenting of subject matter that in fact and science is not 
new, does not involve an inventive step or is not capable of industrial applicability. 
 
In order to illustrate how the flexibility to adopt an inclusive, pro protection interpretation 
of Article 27.1 can and has been used, it is useful to examine certain pharmaceutical 
patents that have been the subject of scientific controversy yet are commonly granted in 
certain producer countries in relation to respective patentability criteria. 
 
Novelty and Second Indications: 
 
‘Second indications’ or new uses of known medicinal products are admitted in some 
countries such as the UK where:  
 
                                                 
115 Intellectual Property Rights in South Africa: An Economic Review of Policy and Impact, p3, Available 
online at:  http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/health.htm (Last Accessed on 23rd February 2007)  
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‘It is legitimate to allow claims directed to the use of a substance for the manufacture of a 
medicament for a specified new and inventive therapeutic application, even in a case where the 
process of manufacture as such does not differ from known processes using the same active 
ingredient’.116 
 
Protecting new uses of known products including in particular, second indications, 
epitomizes an extremely expansive application of novelty because novelty requires that 
the information must not have been available to the public prior to the priority date.117  
 
It is thus clearly abhorrent to logic to consider second indications to be novel as the 
medicament itself (product) and its method of manufacture (process) will be the same as 
that already used for the first pharmaceutical indication.  
 
Inventive Step and Polymorphs: 
 
Patents are frequently granted in the US for polymorphs, these are natural properties 
which are not created or invented; they are found and discovered normally as part of 
routine experimentation. Patents on polymorphs have become common and are often 
used to delay the entry of generic competition. Take for instance the patent granted in the 
US for a polymorph for ranitidine.118 The patent expiring in 2002 was granted for the 
polymorph whereas the main product patent expired in 1995.119 Polymorphs are 
discoveries not inventions; furthermore they are obvious to someone skilled in the art and 
                                                 
116 See, Examination Guidelines for Patent Applications relating to Medical Inventions in the UK 
Patent Office (March 2004) First medical use, Section 2(6), Paragraph 64. 
 
117 Carlos M. Correa, "Traditional Knowledge and Intellectual Property: Issues and Options Surrounding 
the Protection of Traditional Knowledge". Available at: http://www.qiap.ca/pages/publications.html (Last 
Accessed on 12th February 2007). 
 
118 Ranitidine is a histamine that inhibits stomach acid production and is commonly used in the treatment of 
peptic ulcer disease (PUD) and gastoesophageal disease (GERD). It is currently marketed under the trade 
name of Zantac by GlaxoSmithKline. 
 
119 Carlos M. Correa, "Pharmaceutical Inventions: When is the Granting of a Patent Justified"? Int. J. 
Intellectual Property Management, Vol. 1, Nos. 1/2, 2006. (Hereinafter, Correa (2006)), p 18. 
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are therefore not capable of passing an evaluation of inventive step. Their patenting is 
thus an avenue for ‘ever greening’.120 
 
Industrial Applicability and Methods of treatment: 
 
Article 27.3 (a) of The TRIPS Agreement explicitly allows member states to exclude 
methods of treatment from patentability.  Even in the absence of such exclusion in 
domestic legislation however, methods of treatment are not capable of satisfying a 
requirement of industrial applicability since what is new in such method claims is an 
effect on the body, not the product as such or its method of manufacture. In the US 
however, a standard of ‘utility’ is applied allowing the patenting of methods of treatment 
including prevention, diagnosis and profilaxis.121 
 
Moreover, the National Institute for Healthcare Management (NIHCM) compiled a report 
that characterizes the level of innovation of all the new branded medicines that entered 
the US market from 1989 to 2000.122 The report found that the great majority of patents 
are granted not for new therapeutic compounds, but relate to variations in production 
processes, new formulations or crystalline forms, new combinations of known products, 
and new uses of known drugs.  In the period 1989-2000, a mere 153 of the 1035 new 
drug approvals by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) were reported to be for 
drugs that contained new active ingredients and offered significant clinical improvement. 
 
The above examples illustrate the application of very expansive interpretations of the 
patentability criteria. A pro protection patent policy of this nature is not congruent with 
public health policies that facilitate access to medicines. Public health policies in the 
                                                 
120 Professor Correa defines ‘ever greening’ as ‘the patent strategy consisting of acquiring patents on minor, 
often trivial, modifications of existing pharmaceutical products or processes in order to indirectly extend 
the period of patent protection over previously patented compounds’. 
 
121 See, Correa (2006). 
 
122 NIHCM (2002) “Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation”, NIHCM, Washington DC. 
Available at: http://www.nihcm.org/innovations.pdf (Last Accessed on 10th February 2007) 
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developing world should be geared towards a larger public domain to facilitate access to 
medicines and thus exclude the sort of developments discussed above from patent 
protection. 
 
 The TRIPS Agreement can advance the public health needs of countries in the 
developing world in that it contains sufficient flexibility to allow those countries to adopt 
a non inclusive interpretation of Article 27.1 and thus avoid unduly restricting access to 
medicines under a patent system that protects incremental inventions. 
 
Although the TRIPS Agreement obliges WTO Members (except LDCs) to grant patents 
on medicines, nothing obliges developing countries to replicate patent systems of 
industrialized countries. The Agreement allows each country to set its criteria of 
patentability and does not prevent countries from including measures preventing the grant 
of patents for known substances, i.e. trivial patents. Furthermore, the Doha Declaration 
states that “the TRIPS Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a 
manner supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all.”123 Developing countries therefore have the right to 
design their patentability laws in a way that takes their public health needs into account. 
 
Pro protection patent regimes allow the incremental inventions to be patented. 
Policymakers in producer countries argue that strong global protection akin to that found 
in their own jurisdictions would have beneficial spill-overs to poor countries and would 
stimulate innovation in these countries.124 In contrast, renowned economist Keith Maskus 
is of the opinion that “The preponderance of conclusions is pessimistic about the net 
effects of dug patents on the economic welfare of developing countries”.125  
                                                 
123 See,  Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration.  
 
124 See, Trade and Industrial Policy Secretariat (TIPS), South Africa, "Intellectual Property Rights in South 
Africa: An Economic Review of policy and impact", p3. Available at:  
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/health.htm (Last Accessed on 14th March 2007). 
 
125 See, Keith Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and the Global Economy, Institute for International 
Economics (2000) p 160. 
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The resolution of that debate is beyond the scope of the current discussion. What is clear 
however is that interpreting the patentability criteria as expansively as in the examples 
cited above produces at least three adverse effects to public health policies in the 
developing world. These adverse effects are as follows:  
 
First, it delays the entry of generic competition by artificially extending monopoly rights 
to brand producers. Even when there is the possibility to have such patents revoked, 
strategic litigation can be used by brand producers to further inhibit generic 
competition.126 Strategic litigation is effective because generic producers often do not 
have the resources to bring actions for revocation or defend against infringement claims.  
 
Secondly, for countries that have been producing generic medicines by utilizing the 
flexibility within TRIPS in order to not grant pharmaceutical product patents,127 an 
expansive interpretation of the patentability criteria would require a far greater amount of 
mailbox applications to be granted patent status and thus severely restrict the ability of 
those countries to continue to produce generic equivalents.  
 
Finally, the expansive approach to patentability discussed above can inhibit innovation by 
impeding research by non patent holders.  
 
In light of the above, defining ‘inventive step’ is thus one of the most critical aspects of a 
patent regime, as it determines the level of technical contribution required to obtain a 
patent and the corresponding limitation on competition. Since the TRIPS Agreement does 
not define this concept, developing countries are entitled to use this flexibility to ensure 
that they adopt systems that reward only substantial departures from prior art and render 
the myriad of incremental innovations, excluded from patentability.  
 
                                                 
126 Strategic litigation is where brand producers allege infringement and request provisional 
injunctions/interdicts that block commercialization until a final decision is made. 
 
127 See the section on transition periods above. 
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From the perspective of public health in developing countries and LDCs, the application 
of a strict standard of inventiveness and a generally narrow interpretation of the 
patentability criteria is the best policy.128 Such a policy promotes genuine innovations 
and prevents unwarranted limitations to competition and access to existing drugs.  
 
3.5.3 Parallel Importation 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, parallel importation is the import and resale in a 
country, without the consent of the patent holder, of a patented product that has been 
legitimately put on the market of the exporting country under a parallel patent.129  
 
A patent holder may have the exclusive right to manufacture his product and to put it on 
the market; but once the product is placed on the market, the principle of exhaustion 
means that the patent holder has no further right over the product. Thus, a patent holder 
cannot prevent the subsequent resale of that product since their rights over the product 
have been exhausted by the act of selling it.130 This termination of control is critical to 
the functioning of any market economy because it permits the free transfer of goods and 
services. Without an exhaustion doctrine, the original IPR holder would perpetually 
exercise control over the sale, transfer or use of a good or service embodying an IPR, and 
would control economic life.131 
 
During the Uruguay Round negotiations on TRIPS, there was fairly extensive discussion 
of the exhaustion issue, but governments did not come close to agreeing upon a single set 
of exhaustion rules for the new WTO. They instead agreed that each WTO Member 
would be entitled to adopt its own exhaustion policy and rules. This agreement was 
embodied in Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement, which precludes anything in the 
                                                 
128 World Bank (2001) Global Economic Prospects and Developing Countries, p 143. 
 
129 See, Musungu and Oh. 
 
130 Ibid. 
 
131 ICTSD Resource Book, p 93. 
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Agreement from being used to address the exhaustion of rights in dispute settlement, 
subject to national and MFN treatment. Thus Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement can be 
interpreted to permit parallel importation provided that Members use their flexibility to 
determine their own regime for exhaustion to incorporate the principle of international 
exhaustion.132 
 
The Doha Declaration has re-affirmed that each Member is “free to establish its own 
regime for such exhaustion without challenge”.133 The clarification of this concept by the 
Doha Declaration is an added reassurance for Members wishing to adopt an international 
exhaustion principle that it is legitimate and consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.. 
 
This flexibility can be very useful in advancing access to affordable medicines. This is 
because, the fact that WTO Members are free to determine their own exhaustion regimes 
means that a Member wishing to import a medicine whether due to a lack of domestic 
availability or better prices abroad, could pursuant to an international exhaustion regime 
in domestic patent laws, determine a generic version of  a patented medicine 
manufactured under compulsory license in the country of export to have been 
legitimately placed on the international market and thus import that medicine.  
 
3.5.4  Compulsory Licensing and Government Use 
 
Compulsory Licensing: 
 
Compulsory licensing or non-voluntary use is regulated by Article 31 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. A compulsory license is an authorization by a government to a party other 
than the patent holder to use the subject matter of the patent without the consent of the 
patent holder.  
 
                                                 
132 The doctrine of international exhaustion is where a country chooses to recognize that exhaustion of an 
IPR occurs when a good or service is first sold or marketed anywhere in the world. 
 
133 See, Paragraph 5(d) of the Doha Declaration. 
 
 59
It is important to note that Article 31 maintains the utmost flexibility for Members in 
terms of the grounds for the issuing of such a license. While Article 31 sets out certain 
procedural requirements and conditions in the granting of a compulsory license, the 
provision does in no way limit the grounds upon which a compulsory license may be 
issued. This has been confirmed by paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration.134  
 
Therefore domestic law can legitimately provide for a public interest ground (among any 
others) for non voluntary use of a patent. Such a ground could be used for the non 
voluntary use of pharmaceutical product patents by balancing the interests of the public 
to affordable medicines with the commercial interests of the patent holder and finding 
that the former should take precedence.135  
 
Compulsory licensing has long been recognized as the most important tool for addressing 
the adverse effects of patent rights on public welfare (particularly in the context of 
health).136 This is because as noted above, the price of goods is a more significant 
determinant of market demand in low-income countries because consumers have fewer 
resources to allocate among goods. Compulsory licensing is thus an instrument for 
obtaining lower prices on goods protected by patent.  
 
Compulsory licensing can be effective in making lower priced medicines available not 
only when a license is actually issued but also when there is a legitimate threat that such a 
license can be issued because it can serve as leverage in negotiating better terms for a 
                                                 
134 It should be noted that although the conditions in Article 31 do not inhibit the grounds upon which a 
license may be issued, they can inhibit the commercial viability of exploiting them for local firms with such 
capacity. This is an idea that the author will expand upon below in this section. 
 
135 The public interest ground leaves domestic authorities with broad discretion wide enough to encompass 
public health needs through ensuring access to affordable medicines. As such it has been recommended that 
all developing countries incorporate a public interest or similar ground.  
See, Musungu and Oh (2006), p 32. 
 
136 Edith Tilton Pinrose, "The Economics of the International Patent System", Ch. XI 1951: Johns Hopkins 
Press. 
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voluntary license with the patent holder.137 Non Voluntary use or the legitimate threat 
thereof can even cause patent holders to revise their prices.138 A compulsory license can 
legitimately be exploited by local manufacture of the patented product or by import.139 
 
Despite inherent flexibility in the wording of the TRIPS Agreement as confirmed by the 
Doha Declaration and the presence of compulsory licensing legislation in most 
developing countries,140 the actual usage of compulsory licensing by those countries has 
been relatively limited. Professor Abbott has identified three very pertinent factors 
contributing to this scarcity. The author in turn has identified an additional two factors. 
 
The reasons put forth by Abbott are as follows: 
 
First, although TRIPS compliant, the use of compulsory licenses for the manufacture of 
patented medicines has been opposed by developed country WTO Members and pharma. 
The only way to address this concern is a strong political commitment to act in the face 
of this opposition.141  
                                                 
137 For example, following the case of Hazel Tau & Others v. GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim, 
Competition Commission of South Africa (2003), the two pharmaceutical giants cited were found guilty of 
excessive pricing. In a bid to avoid a damaging ruling by the Competition Tribunal that would have lead to 
non voluntary use of the patented subject matter, they negotiated a deal with the complainants that made 
the medicines available on more affordable terms in the South African market. 
See also Bryan C. Mercurio, “Trips, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World” 8 
Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 211, p 224. 
"Use of the threat of compulsory licenses to negotiate favorable terms is not unique to the developing 
world; when fears of an anthrax attack mounted in the United States government, it used the threat of a 
compulsory license to entice Bayer to provide Cipro at a greatly reduced cost. This event was instrumental 
in the US arriving at a compromise on their compulsory licensing position that facilitated the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health".  
 
138  For instance, in the aftermath of the decision by  the Thai government to issue a compulsory license for 
government production of an HIV/AIDS drug, the patent holder of the product, Merck Sharp & Dohme 
(Merck), proposed reducing the price by almost two-thirds, local sources.  
See IPWatch ,”Thailand Compulsory License On AIDS Drug Prompts Policy Debate”, Available at: 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=499&res=1024&print=0, (Last Accessed on 1st April 2007). 
 
139 As mentioned above, paragraph 5(d) Of the Doha Declaration confirms the right of Members referred to 
in footnote 6 to Article 31 to determine when IPRs are deemed exhausted. 
 
140 Musungu and Oh (2006), p 56. 
 
141 Compulsory licenses for pharmaceutical products have traditionally and contemporarily been subject of 
opposition by developed countries and their pharmaceutical industries. The most popular such case came 
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Secondly, some developing countries have expressed concern regarding a potential 
backlash from foreign direct investors. Abbot argues however that this concern should 
not deter Members from issuing compulsory licenses as commercial investors recognize 
the risks posed by public health threats such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and should not 
perceive a compulsory license granted to redress such a crisis as evidence of a risk to general 
commercial investment.142 
 
Finally, domestic administrative procedures for issuing compulsory licenses may be 
either non existent or overly restrictive. Overcoming procedural or process obstacles 
requires governments to adopt legislation that makes the granting of a compulsory license to 
address public health crises fast and inexpensive, technical cooperation from relevant UN 
organizations may be necessary in this regard.143 
 
The two additional obstacles identified by the author are as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
when South Africa adopted the Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, No. 90 of 
1997 which gave the Health Minister wide powers with regard to compulsory licenses/government use of 
pharmaceutical products. As a consequence, the South African government was subjected to a multi 
pronged attack from the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the European Commission and 39 
pharmaceutical companies. The US only backed away after NGO protests threatened to derail the political 
campaign of then US Vice President, Al Gore. The pharmaceutical companies persisted until NGO protests 
threatened a massive public relations disaster. 
See, Abbott, Lighting a Dark Corner, p 471. 
 
In November 2006, the Thai government announced the decision to issue compulsory licenses for Merck 
patented antiretroviral drug, Efavirenz right before World AIDS' Day in 2006. The Doha Declaration and 
subsequent did little to dissuade the US from applying pressure on the Thai Government to revise the 
decision when shortly after the announcement, Ambassador Karan Bhatia, the Deputy USTR, called the 
Thai Embassy in Washington to deliver a message described as "bullying" by Thai government officials. 
Due in no small part to NGO pressure however, the Thai government did not back down and the 
compulsory license is due to remain effective until 2011.  See, James Love, “Merck, USTR ask Thailand to 
Reconsider Compulsory License on AIDS Drug”. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-
love/merck-ustr-ask-thailand-_b_36643.html (Last Accessed on 3rd April2007) 
 
142 Frederick M. Abbott, “Compulsory Licensing for Public HealthNeeds: The TRIPS Agenda at the WTO 
after The Doha Declaration on Public Health ".  
Available at: http://quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/Occassional/Compulsory-Licensing.pdf. (Hereinafter, 
Abbott, Compulsory Licensing for Public Health Needs). 
 
143 Ibid. 
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First, while not affecting the legitimacy of pursuing such an enterprise, certain conditions 
in Article 31 have the potential to make the manufacture of drugs for which a compulsory 
license has been issued, commercially unviable for generic producers. Take for instance 
the requirement of Article 31(e) that a compulsory license be non assignable. The 
provision prevents the creation of a market in compulsory licenses as instruments with 
independent value. The creation of such a market would enhance the value of compulsory 
licenses and encourage parties to seek them.144  
 
Secondly, the grounds for granting compulsory licenses in the domestic legislation of 
developing countries can be unnecessarily restrictive. For instance, the Bangui 
Agreement of 1977 which established the African Intellectual Property Organization 
(OAPI) and was revised in 1999 contains rather restrictive grounds for compulsory 
licensing, for instance it does not contain a public interest ground.145 Countries should 
maintain as much flexibility as permitted under TRIPS concerning the grounds for 
compulsory licensing and should exhibit a strong political will to service the health needs 
of their public in the face of adversity. Countries like South Africa and Thailand have 
shown that this can be done.   
 
While some compulsory licensing safeguards in Article 31 can be described as being too 
focused on protecting the interests of pharmaceutical patent holders at the cost of 
restricting the pursuit of pubic health interests of the poor,146 Article 31 does contain 
                                                 
144 ICTSD Resource Book, p 473. 
 
145  Bangui 1999 has been more generally criticized as applying higher standards of patent protection than 
necessary under TRIPS to the detriment of access to affordable medicines in its member states. For 
instance, Bangui ’99 allows parallel importing only among Member States, this is a severe restriction on 
access to affordable medicines as lower priced versions can often be found at lower prices outside the 
OAPI region. For instance a one-pill combination of the two antiretrovirals AZT and 3TC, costs US$1.96 
in Togo and US$0.94 in Senegal (lowest price within OAPI region), but only US$0.65 in India. Moreover, 
twelve of seventeen OAPI members are LDCs and are thus not obliged by TRIPS to protect pharmaceutical 
product patents, however they are so obliged under Bangui ’99. See, Conference Report: Implementation of 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health Technical Assistance - How to Get it 
Right.” March 2002. Available at:    
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=26420021519443&contenttype=PARA#top 
(Last Accessed on 22nd March 2007).  
 
146 As discussed in the commentary on Article 31(e) above. 
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options to alleviate and counter balance such restrictions. One such option is known as 
the Government Use flexibility.  
 
Government Use: 
 
According to the Government Use flexibility, the obligation, in Article 31(b) for a 
compulsory license applicant to undertake prior negotiations with the patent holder 
preceeding the non voluntary use of the subject matter is waived in cases of “public non-
commercial use”. 
 
This flexibility is particularly significant because the prior negotiation obligation 
contained in Article 31(b) can be used as a delaying tactic by a patent holder that doesn’t 
want to issue a license or see a compulsory license issued to generic industry producers. 
The ‘public non commercial use’ waiver can thus be used by governments (or 
commercial entities acting for non commercial purposes), to effect non voluntary use of a 
patented medicine without undue delay.  
 
This ‘Government Use option is crucial to patients in advanced stages of terminal 
illnesses such as AIDS who are in need of life saving medicines as quickly as possible, 
Thailand used this provision to great effect in November 2006 despite assertions by 
Merck that the government was obliged to negotiate with them before issuing the 
compulsory license.147  
 
3.6 The Article 31(f) Problem 
 
Despite attempts by the drafters to mitigate potential difficulties caused by various 
compulsory licensing terms in the TRIPS Agreement, some problems remain, most 
                                                 
147 See, James Love, “Merck, USTR ask Thailand to Reconsider Compulsory License on AIDS Drug”, 
available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-love/merck-ustr-ask-thailand-_b_36643.html (Last 
Accessed on 3rd April 2007). 
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notably those resulting from paragraph (f) of Article 31 in terms of its effect on countries 
without pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. 
 
 Such countries are unable to exploit compulsory licenses for essential medicines by 
domestic manufacture and thus have a particularly acute problem; they have to meet their 
national demand for cheaper generic drugs by importation. The ability to do so is highly 
dependent on export side capacity to provide adequate amounts to meet the importing 
country’s needs. Article 31(f) is a tremendous barrier to this ability because the said 
provision provides that licenses should be issued “predominantly for the supply of the 
domestic market” of the member granting them, thereby restricting exports to the non 
predominant portion.  
 
Prior to 2005, Article 31(f) was in practice, unlikely to have a serious effect on countries 
depending on compulsory licensing by import because India, a thriving generic producer 
and exporter did not grant pharmaceutical product patent protection and was thus not 
bound by Article 31(f). Indian measures adopted to comply with the TRIPS Agreement 
such as its’ executive ordinance of 2004 coupled with its’ Patent Act amendment of 1999 
result in a loss of unencumbered access to Indian generics produced post 1st January 2005 
and generic versions of medicines for which there are applications in India’s mailbox that 
meet the country’s patentability requirements.148 
 
Article 31(f) frustrates access to affordable medicines on the import side because it 
makes it an infringement to issue a compulsory license for the manufacture of generic 
medicines for the sole purpose of export to a foreign country in need of those medicines. 
According to the said provision, a compulsory license must be issued to supply local 
demand in the predominant part, only the residual portion can be exported. The provision 
thus leads to a tragic paradox in that the WTO Members that are able to take advantage of 
compulsory licensing to supply essential medicines are the countries with capacity to 
                                                 
148See, Abbott, The Medicines Decision, p 320. 
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manufacture those medicines.149 Therefore the countries most in need of generic 
substitutes produced under compulsory license are the countries that are restricted from 
accessing such medicines. 
 
The Council of Ministers recognized this problem and that the ability of a compulsory 
license to satisfy a domestic market by importation was dependant on some legal 
mechanism under which the rights of patent holders in exporting countries would not be 
infringed. The TRIPS Council was thus mandated by paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration to propound such a mechanism, the August 30th 2003 Decision was the 
outcome. 
 
3.7 The August 30th 2003 Decision 
 
While 30th August 2003 Decision is not a TRIPS flexibility in the strict sense, it is an 
attempt by WTO Members to address the problem of those countries unable to effectively 
utilize the flexibility afforded by compulsory licensing. The decision attempts this 
through the use of three substantive waivers with regard to Article 31(f) restriction. 
 
The substantive waivers: 
 
The fist waiver pertains to the obligations of an exporting Member under Article 31(f) of 
the TRIPS Agreement with respect to the grant by that member of a compulsory licence 
to the extent necessary for the purposes of production of a pharmaceutical product(s) and 
its export to an eligible importing Member(s)”.150 
 
The second waiver seeks to do away with double remuneration of the patent holder by 
providing that “adequate remuneration pursuant to Article 31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement 
shall be paid to the exporting Member taking into account the economic value to the 
                                                 
149 See, Abbott 2001. 
 
150 Paragraph 2 of the  August Decision 
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importing Member of the use that has been authorized in the exporting Member”, “…the 
obligation of the importing Member under Article 31(h) shall be waived in respect of 
those products for which remuneration is paid in the exporting Member”.151 
 
While the third and final waiver pertains to the obligations under Article 31(f) of a 
developing country or LDC which is in a regional trade agreement (RTA). The said 
obligations are waived to the extent necessary to enable a pharmaceutical product 
produced or imported under a compulsory licence to be exported to the markets of other 
developing country or LDC parties to a RTA that share the health problem in question.152 
To legitimately use the said waivers, there are a number of terms that must be complied 
with by both importing and exporting members. 
 
Obligations of Importing Members: 
 
With the exception of LDCs, an eligible importing Member must make a prior 
notification to the TRIPS Council specifying the names and expected quantities of the 
product(s) needed,153 confirming that the eligible importing Member in question “has 
established that it has insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical 
sector for the product(s) in question,”154  and confirming that, “where a pharmaceutical 
product is patented in its territory, it has granted or intends to grant a compulsory licence 
in accordance with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement and the provisions of this 
Decision (of August 30th 2003).”155 
                                                 
151 Paragraph 3 
 
152 Paragraph 6 
 
153 Paragraph 2(a)(i). 
 
154 Paragraph 2(a)(ii). The Annex to the decision sets out how the determination of insufficient 
manufacturing capacity should be made. Non LDC Members must establish either an overall lack of 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity or that following self assessment, the Member found that with the 
exclusion of the patent holder, it currently has insufficient pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity to meet 
its needs. The assessment of the sufficiency of manufacturing capacity is done on a product by product 
basis as opposed to sectorally. Should such capacity become sufficient to meet the members needs, then its 
authorization under the decision shall cease. 
 
155 Paragraph 2(a)(iii) 
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In addition, in order to ensure that the products imported under the August 30th 2003 
Decision are used for the public health purposes underlying their importation, eligible 
importing Members are required to “take reasonable measures within their means, 
proportionate to their administrative capacities and to the risk of trade diversion to 
prevent re-exportation of the products that have actually been imported into their 
territories under the system.”156 
 
Obligations of Exporting Members:  
 
Several obligations are imposed on exporting countries utilizing the system. 
 
First, such an exporting country must have issued a compulsory license in accordance 
with Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
Secondly, the compulsory license issued by the exporting Member must contain certain 
conditions. It must stipulate that “only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the 
eligible importing Member(s) may be manufactured under the licence and the entirety of 
this production shall be exported to the Member(s) which has notified its needs to the 
Council for TRIPS.”157 It must also stipulate that “products produced under the licence 
shall be clearly identified as being produced under the system set out in the August 
Decision through specific labelling or marking.”158  
 
Thirdly, the exporting country must also require that “suppliers …distinguish such 
products through special packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the products 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
156 Paragraph 4 
 
157 Paragraph 2(b)(i) 
 
158 Paragraph 2(b)(ii) 
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themselves, provided that such distinction is feasible and does not have a significant 
impact on price.”159  
 
As per the fourth requirement, an exporting country must require that before shipment 
begins, the licensee shall post on a website “the quantities being supplied to each 
destination”,160 and “the distinguishing features of the product(s).”161 
 
The fifth requirement placed on an exporting country pertains to notification. An 
exporting Member is required to notify the TRIPS Council of the grant of the license 
and the conditions attached to it.162  The information provided in the notification shall 
include the name and address of the licensee, the product(s) for which the licence has 
been granted, the quantity(ies) for which it has been granted, the country(ies) to which 
the product(s) is (are) to be supplied and the duration of the licence. The notification shall 
also indicate the address of the website referred to in subparagraph (b) (iii) which was 
mentioned above.163 
 
Finally, an exporting member who has granted a compulsory license under this system 
has an obligation to pay “adequate remuneration” to the patent holder pursuant to Article 
31(h) of the TRIPS Agreement.164 
 
The August 30th 2003 Decision and the waivers contained therein were meant to provide 
a temporary solution to the Article 31(f) problem. The Decision mandated negotiations 
on the first permanent amendment to the TRIPS Agreement as a follow up to the August 
2003 decision. The August 2003 Decision and the waivers granted by it terminate for 
                                                 
159 ibid 
 
160 Paragraph 2(b)(iii). 
 
161 Ibid. 
 
162 Paragraph 2(c). 
 
163 ibid.  
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each Member on the date upon which an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing 
its provisions takes effect for that Member.165 
 
The Chairman’s Statement: 
 
To achieve a much needed consensus on the paragraph 6 question, it became necessary 
for the Chairperson of the General Council to adopt a statement to accompany the August 
30th 2003 Decision.166The Chairman’s Statement was issued essentially to placate the US 
and pharma and to ensure WTO Members that the decision would not be used for 
commercial purposes and thus undermine patent protection. This facilitated the countries 
arriving at a consensus before the biennial meeting of the WTO Ministerial Conference in 
2003.  
 
The Chairman’s Statement has four important clauses: a ‘good faith’ clause’,167 an ‘anti-
diversion’ clause,168 a ‘transparency’ clause,169 and a ‘peaceful and expeditious 
settlement of dispute’ clause. The Chairman's Statement also contains best practices used 
by companies such as GSK to minimise the diversion of their products. 
 
The legal significance of the Chairperson’s Statement is unclear. As a practical 
                                                 
165 Paragraph 1l. 
 
166 See, World Trade Organization, The General Council Chairperson’s Statement, August 30, 2003, 
available at, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/trips_stat_28aug03_e.htm. (Hereinafter 
Chairman’s Statement).  
 
167 Ibid. The clause states that WTO Members “recognize that the system that will be established by the 
Decision should be used in good faith to protect public health” and “not be an instrument to pursue 
industrial or commercial policy objectives.” 
 
168 Ibid. In this clause, Members agree that “all reasonable measures should be taken to prevent … 
diversion in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the Decision.” 
 
169 Ibid. The importance of notifications made under paragraph 2(a)(ii) of the Decision pertaining to 
eligibility of importing countries are underpinned by this clause as well as the instruction that  such 
notifications should include information on how the Member in question established that it has insufficient 
or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector. 
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matter however, countries seeking to avail themselves of the August 30th 2003 Decision 
would be well-advised to make sure that their implementation of Decision is consistent 
with the Chairperson’s Statement in order to avoid legal challenges.170 
 
The significance of the Chairman’s Statement does not rest solely within its wording 
especially since its value as a legally binding document is unclear. The role played by the 
statement in facilitating an agreement in the August 30th  2003 Decision negotiations as 
well as its role as a factor dividing developing and developed countries in the subsequent 
negotiations on a permanent amendment are worth noting. This is because in the absence 
of the statement, the US would in all likelihood have not agreed to the August 30th 2003 
Decision and with regard to the negotiations on the permanent amendment, so much 
attention was given to debating whether or not the statement should be included in the 
final amendment that little time was spent discussing and improving upon more 
substantive provisions. 171 During the latter negotiations developing countries opposed 
the inclusion of the Chairman's Statement for fear that it would make it even more 
difficult to use the system while developed countries pushed for its inclusion as an 
assurance against mela fide use the waivers to the detriment of their pharmaceutical 
industries. 
 
3.8 The August 30th 2003 Decision: A Critical Analysis 
 
The August 30th 2003 Decision and accompanying Chairman's Statement were hailed by 
the pharmaceutical industry as a welcome conclusion to the negotiations. In fact, 
Shannon Hertzfeld, the Senior Vice President of International Affairs of the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association (PhRMA) issued the following 
statement on the day the negotiations were concluded:  
                                                 
170 See, Frederick M. Abbott and Rudolf V. Van Puymbroeck," Compulsory Licensing for Public Health: A 
Guide and Model Documents for Implementation of The Doha Declaration Paragraph 6 Decision. 
World Bank Working Paper No.61 (Hereinafter, Abbott and Van Puymbroek). 
 
171 See, Duncan Matthews, "From the August 30, 2003 WTO Decision to the December 6, 2005 
Agreemement on an Amendment to TRIPS: Improving Access to Medicines in Developing Countries"? 
(2006) 10 Intellectual Property Quarterly 91-130. (Hereinafter Duncan Matthews (2006)). 
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“The two decisions that the General Council reached today will ensure that the system will not be 
abused. The additional clarifications contained in the Chairperson’s statement add strong 
provisions to prevent diversion, and increase the likelihood that the solution will benefit patients in 
the world’s poorest countries as envisioned in the Doha Declaration. Taken as a whole, this 
solution reaffirms the critical role of patents in the development of new medicines”.172 
 
Reading the decision from the perspective of stakeholders in the developing world, there 
are some very positive aspects to be drawn. For instance, the scope of the August 30th 
2003 Decision is wide in terms of pharmaceutical products and diseases covered.   
 
Pharmaceutical products are defined as any patented product or product manufactured 
with a patented process. Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) are expressly 
included.173 With regard to diseases covered, by not listing the diseases and through cross 
reference with the Doha Declaration, the decision is wide enough to cover all serious 
public health problems.174  
 
The Chairman’s statement suggests that the scope of the August 30th 2003 Decision goes 
beyond serious public health problems as it explicitly notes that some countries will only 
use the system for emergencies. It can thus be deduced that the system will normally 
apply to non emergencies (including routine public health care).  
                                                 
172 The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association, Statement from Shannon Herzfeld, 
PhRMA’s Senior Vice President, International Affairs in reaction to the successful conclusion of the 
negotiations on TRIPS and Public Health. Available at: 
http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/30.08.2003.841.cfm (Last Accessed on April 10th 2007) 
 
173 Paragraph 1(a). The express inclusion of active pharmaceutical ingredients is significant because it 
broadens the scope of the decision to include a whole host of countries who may have significant 
innovative capacity in the pharmaceutical sector but not quite sophisticated enough to produce active 
ingredients. Thus the decision could be used by not only the very poorest developing countries with 
completely non existent manufacturing capacity but by any country experiencing public health problems 
and difficulties supplying affordable medication provided of course that the country has not opted out of 
using the decision as an importer. 
 
174 This was a significant victory for developing countries in the negotiations as the US had unsuccessfully 
attempted to restrict the application of the decision to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, the three 
diseases specifically mentioned in paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration. See, paragraph 1(a) of the August 
30th 2003 Decision, paragraph 1 of the Doha Declaration and Abbott, The Medicines Decision, p 328. 
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Another element of the decision favoring stakeholders in the developing world, 
particularly LDCs is that it contains a legal presumption in favor of LDCs’ eligibility.175 
Other WTO Members may use the decision upon notification to the TRIPS Council.176 
Such notification is not determinative of the country’s eligibility, it is merely intended to 
promote transparency.  
 
Concern that the decision’s wide scope in terms of eligible countries could see it benefit 
predominantly developed countries and high income developing countries as seen 
previously with compulsory licensing is allayed by the fact that most developed WTO 
Members have opted out of using the decision as importers.177These developed countries 
were joined by the 10 latest EU members.178 Furthermore, high income developing 
countries have pledged to limit their importation under the mechanism to situations of 
national emergency or extreme urgency.179    
 
The definition of an exporting Member under the August 30th 2003 Decision is wide 
enough to encompass any WTO Member with the capacity to export the products in 
question to an eligible importing member.180 
 
                                                 
175 Paragraph 1(b) of the August decision. It should be noted that this is a significant degree of leeway as 
certain LDCs do have reproductive capabilities in terms of finished products from imported ingredients in 
the pharmaceutical sector; yet the presumption ensures that their ability to use the decision is not 
prejudiced. An example of such an LDC according is Zambia. See, Correa, (2002). 
 
176 Paragraph 1(b) of the August decision. 
 
177 These members are listed in a footnote to paragraph 1(b), they are  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of 
America. 
 
178 Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Malta and Cyprus.  
 
179 See, The Chairman’s Statement.  The said countries are listed as follows: Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong, 
Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Macao, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. 
 
180 Paragraph 1(c). 
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An important feature of the August 30th 2003 Decision is that the paragraph 6 waiver is 
of benefit to trade groupings in Africa. Specifically, the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
qualify to use the waiver, these are regions where the diseases necessitating access to 
affordable medicines are most severe.181  
 
The waiver allows these regional blocs to make use of economies of scale by bulk 
procurement by one (or more) of the members. It also facilitates the importation of 
component materials, formulation into finished products, and export to countries of the 
RTA. In the event of re-exportation to members of the RTA, paragraph 6 of the August 
30th 2003 Decision does not impose any obligation of notification to the WTO. As an 
additional flexibility, the regional organization may make the required notification to the 
WTO of actual importation on behalf of all the importing members of the RTA.182 
Members of eligible RTA's will need to harmonize their IP legislation in order to take 
advantage of the opportunities created by paragraph 6.183   
 
There is however a potentially disabling limitation to the paragraph 6 waiver arising from 
the conditions for its utilization. The waiver requires that the exporting country have the 
status of developing country or LDC and that the RTA contain at least a fifty percent 
LDC membership. While these requirements ensure a system that directly benefits the 
regions most in need of access to essential medicines, it also results in a system that may 
not be sustainable, take for instance the case of SADC. The said regional bloc has a 
membership comprising of exactly fifty percent developing country and fifty percent 
LDC membership, therefore the graduation of any member would render the RTA 
ineligible for the paragraph 6 waiver.184  
                                                 
181 See, Chapter 1above, the section entitled, "The Significance of the Study".  
 
182 See, Abbott and Van Puymbroek. 
 
183 See, Avafia, Berger and Hartzenberg. 
 
184 Madalitso M. Mmeta "Amendment to TRIPs Agreement: consensus or dissension"? Available at: 
http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=5393 (Last Accessed on 30th December 2006. (Hereinafter 
Mmeta (2006)).  
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Another very important merit of the August 30th 2003 Decision from the perspective of 
IP users in the developing world is the fact that paragraph 9 explicitly retains the 
flexibility that Members have under the TRIPS Agreement and reaffirmed by the Doha 
Declaration with regard to provisions other than Articles 31(f) and (h). 
 
The most significant benefit of the mechanism is perhaps the most apparent, the fact that 
the production of pharmaceutical products for the sole purpose of exportation is allowed. 
This alone in theory makes medicines more accessible in countries lacking 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.  
 
In practice however, the positive effect of the mechanism on access to medicines in the 
countries targeted may be less clear as NGOs and commentators alike have pointed out. 
They have been very critical of the August 2003 decision. Some NGOs have labelled it a 
gift bound in red tape.185 
 
The statement by PhRMA on the August 30th 2003 Decision presupposes that the 
mechanism can and will actually be used by the world’s poorest countries. That 
assumption is currently far from proven. To date, the August 30th Decision has never 
been used by any country and has thus not benefited a single patient in any poor country. 
In exploring why this has been the case, it is necessary to consider some of the 
difficulties posed by various aspects of the Decision. 
 
                                                 
185 Joint NGO Statement on TRIPS and Public Health WTO Deals on Medicine: A “Gift” Bound in Red 
Tape (September 10, 2003). Available at: http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ngos09102003.html 
(Hereinafter Joint NGO Statement( 2003)). The statement was signed by the following organizations: ACT 
Up Paris; Consumer Project on Technology; Consumers International; Essential Action; European AIDS 
Treatment Group; Health Action International; Health GAP; International People's Health Council; 
Médecins Sans Frontières; OXFAM International; People's Health Movement; SEATINI; Third World 
Network; Women in Development; CPTech; HAI; HealthGAP; MSF; Oxfam; and Third World Network. 
 
 75
The fact that each and every condition must be fulfilled over and over again for each and 
every drug and for each and every country by whom and to whom the drug will be 
exported has been described as a procedural nightmare.186 
 
Procedural and administrative obstacles have traditionally been attributed as contributory 
factors in the relative scarcity of the use of compulsory licenses in developing 
countries.187 If the use of the original Article 31 was hindered by administrative 
constraints, it is unclear how a system which brings forth additional an more cumbersome 
procedural requirements which must be satisfied every time the decision is used will not 
in fact exasperate that particular obstacle. The August 30th 2003 Decision does encourage 
technical cooperation from developed Members in case of difficulty in utilizing the 
system. The TRIPS regime however, has always encouraged developed countries to 
provide technical cooperation through Article 67 yet administrative obstacles to 
compulsory licensing have persisted regardless. 
 
Under the August 30th 2003 Decision, generic manufacturers must differentiate pill size, 
shape, and color from brand-name products. These measures are to act as safeguards on 
re-importation. There is a legitimate fear however that the safeguards may prove too 
costly for developing countries and generic manufacturers alike and thus discourage the 
use of compulsory licensing. 
 
The author is not at all suggesting that safeguards against diversion are not necessary, to 
the contrary it is imperative for public health in poor countries that medicines imported 
under the August 30th 2003Decision would reach their intended recipients. What the 
author questions however is whether giving the TRIPS Council the authority to second 
guess and interfere with the terms of compulsory licenses by requiring them to 
                                                 
186 Uche Ewelukwa, "Patent Wars in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: The Pharmaceutical Industry,  
Ethics and Global Trade".Available at: 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1558&context=expresso (Last Accessed on 10th April 
2007).(Hereinafter, Ewelukwa, Patent Wars). 
 
187 See, Abbott, The Medicines Decision. 
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incorporate specific terms is appropriate.188 It is difficult to reconcile this requirement 
with paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration which confirms the right of Members to 
determine their own compulsory licensing terms. It would thus be a better practice to 
allow the countries concerned to maintain their traditional right under the TRIPS 
Agreement as confirmed by the Doha Declaration to determine their own compulsory 
licensing terms including independently determined safeguards for preventing diversion. 
 
Although double compensation has been eliminated by the waiver of Article 31(h) 
remuneration for the importer, paragraph 3 which provides the waiver contains no 
safeguard against the said remuneration being added to the price of the medicines which 
is paid by the importer.  
 
The August 30th 2003 Decision still requires that compulsory licenses be issued on both 
import and export side, maintaining the obligation to grant two compulsory licenses can 
cause significant delays.  
 
One may counter-argue that the requirement to attain two compulsory licenses can not be 
attributed to the August 2003 Decision as it was always present in the TRIPS Agreement. 
In fact it is also arguable that it would be easier for generic producers to gain voluntary 
licenses from brand producers in potential exporter countries because their fears of being 
undercut are allayed by the safeguards and restrictions imposed by the Decision. What 
such an argument fails to consider however is that the safeguards and restrictions in the 
Decision impose significant obligations on potential exporter generic producers which 
result in a lack of commercial viability and are thus  likely to create disincentives for 
generic companies seek the compulsory licenses necessary to produce and export the 
medicines needed by poor countries. 
 
Health GAP (an AIDS Activist Organization) has argued moreover that the solution 
crafted by the August 30th 2003 Decision “is a failure for people with AIDS, and people 
                                                 
188 See, paragraph 2(a)(ii) August 30th 2003 Decision and The  Best Practices Guidelines in  the Chairman’s 
Statement. 
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everywhere dying of treatable diseases”. The argument is that even if a willing and 
capable generic producer in an amenable exporting country is identified, “in the time it 
would take a generic company and the countries concerned to comply with all the 
conditions set out by the August 2003 decision, a patent would likely expire anyway.”189 
The criticism appears to be harsh but when one considers that the steps that must be taken 
in order to legitimately use the decision, the critique is not frivolous. The said steps are: 
 
(1) Where the compulsory license is by a country that has no capacity to manufacture the 
medicine locally and the country is not a LDC, such a country must assess its industry’s 
capacity to produce the medicine locally, notify the TRIPS Council of its determination 
that it has no or insufficient capacity, and explain and justify its decision regarding 
capacity.190  
 
(2) The importing country must identify and notify a willing exporter that has sufficient 
capacity to manufacture the needed medicine. 
 
(3) The prospective exporter must seek a compulsory license from its own government. In 
granting the license, the prospective exporting country must ensure that the conditions 
stipulated in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
(4) If and when a license is granted, the exporter must take adequate measures as 
stipulated in the Decision to prevent diversion. In particular, the exporter must: (a) 
produce only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing Member; 
                                                 
189 Health GAP Global Access Project, “Bush Administration, Big Pharma about to secure disastrous 
"solution" on access to medicines at the WTO in effort to boost failing pre-Cancun talks, countries are 
poised for sell-out on public health”, Press Release ( August 28, 2003) , available at: 
http://www.healthgap.org/press_releases/03/082803_HGAP_PS_WTO_para6_aug30text.html (Last 
Accessed on 10 April 2007).  
 
190 This assessment alone could take a substantial amount of time, particularly where the country does have 
some pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity but it must undertake a defendable assessment of the entire 
national pharmaceutical industry which concludes that the country lacks the capacity to produce a 
particular product. Such an assessment on its own is technology and resource intensive and thus poorer 
countries may lack capacity to undertake a scientifically cogent assessment to the same extent that they 
lack capacity to manufacture the relevant product in the first place. 
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(b) export the entirety of the production to the Member(s) which notified its needs to the 
Council for TRIPS; (c) clearly identify the products produced under the system through 
specific labeling or marking, special packaging and/or special coloring/shaping of the 
products themselves; (d) before shipment begins, post on a website, the quantities being 
supplied to each destination and the distinguishing features of the product(s).191  
 
Once the steps required to legitimately use the decision are laid down in this sequence, 
the concerns of Health GAP seem legitimate. 
 
One of the supposed benefits of the August 30th 2003 Decision is that it creates a climate 
of legal certainty for countries that they will not be challenged for using the system. This 
legal certainty is said to be provided by the moratorium in paragraph 10 of the August 
30th 2003 Decision. 
 
It is not clear however if Members who utilize the system are completely immune from 
lawsuits under the WTO dispute settlement procedure. The Decision provides that 
“Members shall not challenge any measures taken in conformity with the provisions of 
the waivers contained in this Decision”. This provision on moratorium is unilateral and 
not legally binding. This is because the moratorium is only a promise not to bring a 
lawsuit and thus falls short of a legally binding statement of non justiciability which is a 
clear, multilateral determination that actions taken under the mechanism are non- 
justiciable.192  
 
This uncertainty coupled with the track record of industrialized countries and pharma on 
allowing developing countries to exercise their compulsory licensing rights render it 
unsurprising that Members concerned have been hesitant to use the mechanism created 
by the August 30th 2003 Decision. 
                                                 
191 See, Ewelukwa, Patent Wars. 
 
192 Amir Attaran, "The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 
Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options Under WTO Law", (2002) 12 Fordham Intellectual  Property. 
Media & Entertainment Law .Journal 859, quoted in Ewelukwa, Patent Wars. 
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Some criticisms leveled by NGOs appear to be voiced for the sake of opposing. Among 
these is the criticism that the August 2003 Decision “contradicts the basic principles of 
the WTO and fair trade” by prohibiting the export of drugs manufactured under the 
system to rich countries.193 This contention completely ignores the fact that the Decision 
is meant to benefit poor countries whose poverty renders Article 31(f) an obstacle to their 
use of compulsory licensing. The contention marks a notable departure from the very role 
of those NGOs as advocates for the need to balance free trade with the development 
objectives of the south. 
 
Some commentators reserved criticism preferring rather to allow the actual effect that the 
August 30th 2003 Decision would have on access to medicines in countries without 
manufacturing capacity be the determinative factor on the success or failure of the same. 
One such commentator, Constantine Michalopoulos opined as follows: 
 
“It is important that the agreement reached on means to operationalise the exception on the 
imports of low cost drugs by developing countries finally reached in August 2003 is shown to be 
an effective solution through its rapid use by those countries in need and, if not, that more 
effective measures with less constraints be introduced”.194 
 
The view of Michalopoulos is logical as a mechanism which does not fulfill its purpose 
should not be maintained. Therefore the fact that the August 30th 2003 Decision (contrary 
to the prediction of PhARMA) has not benefited a single patient, tends strongly towards 
vindication of the view of critics. 
 
Paragraph 11 of the August 30th 2003 is thus problematic as it mandated negotiation on a 
permanent amendment of TRIPS based on the August 2003 decision regardless of 
whether or not the mechanism proved effective. Surely a permanent amendment based on 
                                                 
193 Joint NGO Statement (2003). 
 
194 See, Michalopoulos, p 2. 
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the August 2003 decision could rationally only be introduced once the latter had been 
tested and shown to be effective.195 
 
There is currently a dissenting view emerging to the effect that the August 30th 2003 
mechanism need not actually be used to lower the price of medicines because the mere 
existence creates the threat of compulsory licensing and thus the mechanism will serve as 
a bargaining tool for licensing negotiations with patent holders.196  
 
The author disputes this reasoning on the basis that as per Abbott, the threat of 
compulsory licensing can only be an effective bargaining tool where there is a real and 
legitimate threat of a compulsory licensing.197 The conditions imposed by the mechanism 
coupled with the fact that it has never been used render the threat of compulsory licensing 
posed under the August 30th 2003 mechanism no more than theoretical. 
 
3.9 The 2005 Amendment Decision 
 
The reasoning of commentators like Michalopoulos however, did not prevail. December 
6th 2005 saw agreement reached on the text of an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement 
based on the August 30th 2003 waiver as mandated by paragraph 11 of the decision.  
Sadly, most of the discussion in the 2005 Amendment Decision negotiations focused on 
if and how the Chairman’s Statement should be included in the permanent amendment as 
                                                 
195 WTO Members Should Reject Bad Deal on Medicines, Joint Statement by NGOs on TRIPS and Public 
Health, December 3 2005, (hereinafter NGO Statement (2005)). Available at: 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ngos12032005.html  
 
196 See, Mmeta (2006), p8. 
 
197  F M. Abbott, "WTO TRIPS Agreement and Its Implications for Access to Medicines in Developing 
Countries", IPR Commission, Study Paper 2a. Available at: 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp2a_abbott_study.pdf (Last Accessed on 24th 
April 2007). 
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opposed to how to make the substantive provisions of the August 30th 2003 Decision  
more effective in promoting access to medicines in the intended recipient countries,198  
 
The 2005 Amendment Decision was designed to match the August 30th 2003 Decision as 
closely as possible except for one significant change to the list of Members which opted 
out of using the waiver as importing Members. The change is that reference to the EC no 
longer contains the names of the individual states, it now refers to the EC with the effect 
that all states that are members of the EC immediately adopt the opt out upon accession 
to the EU. 
 
The 2005 Amendment Decision consists of a protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement, 
an annex to the protocol amending TRIPS Agreement, an Annex to the TRIPS 
Agreement and an appendix to the Annex to the TRIPS Agreement.199 
 
The amendment will come into effect once two thirds of WTO membership has adopted 
the same; the deadline for two thirds assent is set at 1 December 2007 but is renewable. 
 
The substantive part of the amendment is contained in Article 31bis which is contained in 
the Annex to the Protocol amending the TRIPS Agreement and consists of five 
paragraphs, they provide the following: 
 
An Article 31(f) waiver; an Article 31(h) import side waiver with a view to preventing 
double remuneration; a waiver of Article 31(f) to the extent necessary to allow regional 
exportation of pharmaceutical products imported under compulsory license, provided the 
importing Member is a Developing country or LDC and is part of an RTA, composition 
is at least 50% LDC; a moratorium on non violation complaints against measures taken in 
                                                 
198 See, the minutes of the TRIPS Council Meetings of March 31 2005; June 14 – 15, 2005; and October 
25-26,2005. See also “TRIPS Council Still Divided on Public health Amendment”, Bridges Weekly Trade 
News Digest, Vol. 9, No.36. Available at: http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/05-10-26/index.htm 
  
199 Duncan Matthews (2006), p111. 
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conformity with the system; and the retention of  all existing TRIPS flexibilities not 
pertaining to Articles 31(f) and (h).200 
 
The terms of using the substantive waivers are contained in the new Annex to the TRIPS 
Agreement and like the substantive paragraphs discussed above, are based on the 
conditions set out in the August 30th 2003 Decision.201  
 
With regard to the Chairman's Statement, it is not expressly mentioned in the 2005 
Amendment Decision although it is arguable that its effect remains due to the 
choreography adopted for the adoption of the amendment which included the reading of 
the chairman’s statement by the Chairman of the General Council of the WTO.202 
 
The 2005 Amendment Decision was heralded by WTO Director General Pascal Lamy as 
confirming “once again that Members are determined to ensure that the WTO trading 
system contributes to humanitarian goals”. Other proponents of the 2005 Amendment 
Decision have argued that it improves the legal certainty of the waivers propounded by 
the August 30th 2003 Decision. 
 
Conversely, NGOs are not convinced by the 2005 Amendment Decision., 31 NGOs 
issued a joint statement to that effect on Monday, 5th December 2005.203. The NGOs 
expressed alarm that such an important instrument was based on a mechanism that has 
                                                 
200 Ibid.  
 
201  Ibid, pg 113. 
 
202 See, “Choreography for the Adoption of the Decision on the Amendment,” para 5.  Available at: 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2005-December/008774.html, (Last Accessed on 18th April 
2007). See also Duncan Matthews (2006), pg 112. 
 
203The NGOs included Oxfam, Action Aid, Christian Aid, Health GAP, CPTech, Health Action 
International (Africa and Asia Pacific), Ecumenical Advocacy Alliance, Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres 
Comite International, Medecins sans Frontieres Access to Essential Medicines Campaign, Act Up Paris, 
Third World Network and scores of treatment access groups issued a public statement urging WTO 
delegates to reject a bad deal on medicines.    
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failed to improve access to medicines.204 Criticism of the Amendment was not restricted 
to NGOs though. Three members of the US Congress, Henry Waxman, Sherrond Brown 
and Thomas Allen, wrote an open letter to then USTR, Robert Portman requesting 
immediate clarification on the US governments position on compulsory licensing and by 
importation. The letter asked specifically why the US intended to make permanent a 
system that had been criticized as overly burdensome and had not yet been shown to be 
effective.205 
 
The fact that the WTO Members from different ends of the TRIPS/Public Health debate 
could come to a compromise culminating in a landmark decision to amend the TRIPS 
Agreement . Yet as various NGOs have pointed out, it did not make much sense to base 
the 2005 Amendment Decision on a mechanism that has never been used and which 
contains time consuming, costly and cumbersome conditions that arguably make the 
mechanism unworkable These constraints tend to defeat the very purpose of the 2005 
Amendment Decision, to make it easier for countries without pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacity to import the medicines they need.  
Therefore, delaying the 2005 Amendment Decision would have been a better option as it 
would have provided an opportunity for testing and improving the August 30th 2003 
Decision. There was no necessity to conclude the negotiations on an amendment to the 
TRIPS Agreement in 2005 since the waivers of the August 30th 2003 Decision, according 
to paragraph 11 thereof would only terminate on the date on which an amendment to the 
TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes effect for that Member, effectively 
rendering the 30th August 2003 waiver permanent.206 
                                                 
204 See MSF, Amendment to WTO TRIPS Agreement Makes Access to Affordable Medicines Even More 
Bleak. Available at: http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid=71220051425522&contenttype=PARA (Last Accessed on 14th April 
2007). 
 
205 The letter was sent the day before the 2005 Amendment Decision was adopted by the General Council 
but 6 days after the draft text was made available on 29th November 2005. 
See, “Text with footnotes of Waxman, Allen, Brown letter to USTR”. Available at: 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2005-December/008776.html (Last Accessed on 18th April 
2007). 
 
206 NGO Statement (2005). 
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It is also difficult to conclusively judge the August 2003 Decision and the subsequent 
2005 Amendment Decision in the absence of testing by importing and exporting 
Members. It is however clear that the conditions imposed on Members wishing to use the 
mechanism are highly complex and have the potential to render the mechanism 
unworkable. 
 
3.10 An Alternative Solution to the Article 31(f) Problem 
 
Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement provides in relevant part as follows: 
 
“Members are not obliged to apply the conditions set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such 
use is permitted to remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-
competitive. The need to correct anti-competitive practices may be taken into account in 
determining the amount of remuneration in such cases”. 
 
A compulsory license issued in accordance with Article 31(k) is thus impervious to inter 
alia, the Article 31(f) restriction. The provision contains considerable flexibility as it is 
left to the Members concerned to define in their own domestic law what they consider to 
be anti competitive practice. To a large extent though, the effective utilization of this 
provision will be dependant on relevant countries’ capacity and legal infrastructure in the 
field of competition law.207   
 
Thus, to conclude as to whether the above discussed flexibilities are sufficient to foster an 
equitable balance in the TRIPS patent regime, one can comment that the operational 
transition period currently offers limited benefits to the developing world but there are 
significant opportunities with regard to exemption from patentability, parallel importation 
and compulsory licensing. 
 
Compulsory licensing however offers a very different extent of benefit for richer 
developing countries with pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity than for poorer 
                                                 
207 See, Avafia, Berger and Hartzenberg. 
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developing countries and LDCs. For the former, depending on their implementation, 
there are significant opportunities within the compulsory licensing provisions of the 
TRIPS Agreement to genuinely facilitate greater access to affordable medicines. As far as 
countries without pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity are concerned however, there 
are significant problems and it is rather doubtful whether the TRIPS Agreement and the 
subsequent developments on their own can offer much of a reprieve. 
 
 
4. Chapter 4: Is Our Implementation Adequate? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The TRIPS flexibilities are now well established. What is also well established is that 
whatever benefits that may accrue to countries from the TRIPS flexibilities do not arise 
automatically; they are dependant on implementation and utilization by nations. The 
WHO recognizes this reality and has accordingly urged WTO Members to “consider, 
whenever necessary, adapting national legislation in order to use to the full the 
flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement”.208  
 
Therefore, this chapter will examine the extent to which two potentially significant 
countries have implemented and utilized TRIPS flexibilities and in so doing, answer the 
second question posed by the title of this thesis, namely, “is our implementation 
adequate”? The reasons why these two countries in particular were chosen are explained 
in the introduction to each case study below. 
 
4.2 India: A Brief Introduction 
 
                                                 
208 Fifty-Sixth World Health Assembly, Agenda item 14.9, WHA56.27, 28 May 2003 
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India’s policy of not granting patents for medicines and their utilization of flexibility in 
the TRIPS Agreement to continue not granting such patents proved hugely important for 
the country’s industrial development, meeting domestic public health needs and the 
public health needs of an un-estimated number of countries internationally. The specifics 
of why this is so will be discussed in full below. What is important for this brief 
introduction is to note that India’s inclusion in the study is a consequence of the 
importance of the nation’s patent laws and continued use of TRIPS flexibilities in terms 
of how it affects the ability of the country’s pharmaceutical industry to supply generic 
medicines, not just for India but for many countries across the developing world.  
 
4.3 Introduction to Relevant Aspects of Indian Patent Legislation 
 
Patent law in India originated in colonial times with the Patents and Designs Act of 1911 
which consolidated pre-existing colonial Patent rights. After colonialism, however it 
emerged that these laws were not suited to national objectives, this lead to the formation 
of the Tek Chand Patents Enquiry Committee in 1948 and the and the more famous 
Ayyangar Committee in 1959. These committees employed an evidence based, analytical 
and transparent review of the domestic and international patent regimes. The result was 
the Indian Patent Act of 1970 (IPA'1970). The legislation was described by Justice 
Krishna Iyer (perhaps the most revered judge of the Indian Supreme Court) as follows: 
 
“A well debated, development-oriented and patriotically processed statute of 1970, with a 
progressive perspective...passed after a thorough study, a tremendous national triumph”.209 
 
Justice Iyer is not alone in his appreciation of IPA' 1970, the Act is widely regarded as a 
watershed in the Industrial development of India. It preserves the continuing interest of 
the inventor in his creation, the social interest in encouraging research, the consumers’ 
                                                 
209 Dwijen Rangnekar, “No Pills for Poor People? Understanding the Disembowelment of India’s Patent 
Regime”. Available online at: 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/workingpapers/2005/wp17605.pdf (Last Accessed on 5th 
April 2007). (Hereinafter Rangnekar (2005)). 
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interest in enjoying the fruits of inventors' reasonable cost, and the creation of conditions 
for the acceleration and promotion of the economic development of the country.210  
 
Full compliance with the TRIPS Agreement necessitated the promulgation of three 
amendments to IPA 1970.  
 
The first was enacted following a ruling in the DSB of the WTO that India had failed to 
implement its obligations with respect to Articles 70.8 and 70.9. Therefore, India enacted 
the first amendment, The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999 (No. 17 of 1999), adding 
Chapter IVA titled ‘exclusive marketing rights’.  
 
The second amendment, Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 (No. 38 of 2002) was enacted 
on 25 June, 2002.  
 
The final patent-related obligation, product patents in exempt technologies,211 was to be 
enacted through the Patents (Amendment) Bill, 2003, but this lapsed with the dissolution 
of Parliament. The new government decided to introduce a marginally revised version of 
the same as the Patents (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 (Ord. No. 7 of 2004) (hereinafter, 
the Ordinance) in light of the 1 January, 2005 deadline.  
 
A final amendment was required to placate critics of the Ordinance which had raised 
protests from within India and all corners of the world including multilateral 
organisations such as the WHO and UNAIDS. These critics described the implications of 
the Ordinance as ‘potentially devastating’ to developing countries and LDCs who are 
dependent on Indian generic drugs. Responding to the widespread criticism, the 
government withdrew or re-drafted certain amendments to the Ordinance and Parliament 
gave its approval to the bill with those amendments on 23rd March 2005.  
 
                                                 
210 Musungu and Oh (2006). 
 
211 Namely, pharmaceutical and agrichemical products. 
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Thus in the final analysis, the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005 (hereinafter, 2005 Act) 
which received presidential assent is the instrument currently governing patent protection 
in India. Therefore the proceeding commentary on the implementation of TRIPS 
flexibilities in Indian patent law will be based predominantly on the 2005 Act.  
 
4.4 Implementation of Flexibilities in India's New Patent Law 
 
4.4.1 Transition Periods 
 
India is a country with low cost human resources possessing specialist skills as well as a 
large domestic market for pharmaceuticals. The fulfillment of these preconditions made 
low cost pharmaceutical production economically viable in India.   
 
The transition period applying to India was ended with the inception of the 2005 Act; this 
obviously necessitates discussion of the transition period applicable to India to being 
based on previous legislation. 
 
IPA 1970 provided in Chapter II, Section 5 that inventions in the technological area of 
chemicals, food and drugs would be limited to claims regarding methods or processes of 
manufacture thus prohibiting product patents. As predicted by the Ayyangar committee, 
the country’s process patent regime allowed their skilled scientists to develop alternative 
processes to manufacture equivalents of pharmaceutical products. This resulted in 
technological advancement and the development of a massive pharmaceutical industry 
able to provide low cost generic medicines not only domestically but to a huge range of 
international clientele.212  
 
The importance of India as an international supplier of generics is highlighted when you 
consider inter alia the following:  
 
                                                 
212 Rangnekar (2005). 
  
 89
80% of ARVs that Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) uses for distribution in over 30 
developing countries are purchased from India; over 50% of essential medicines that 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) distributes to in developing countries are 
purchased from India; and 75-80% of medicines distributed by the International 
Dispensary Association to developing countries are manufactured in India. 213 
 
Excluding pharmaceutical product patents quite literally made India, the pharmacy of the 
poor. 
 
Before the Ordinance, India utilized the Article 65.4 transition period to continue not 
granting patent protection for pharmaceutical products as mandated by Article 28 and the 
non discrimination clause of the TRIPS Agreement.  
 
India’s utilization of the transition period meant that applications for medicines already in 
India’s mailbox did not have to be assessed until 2005 including medicines discovered 
between 2000 and 2005. This ensured  from the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement,  
at least 10 more years of virtually unfettered access to essential medicines for its own 
population including an estimated 5,700,000 Indians living with HIV/AIDS,214 and even 
greater numbers of people across the developing world living with inter alia  HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis and malaria.215  
 
One of the major areas of concern about India’s full compliance with the TRIPS 
Agreement was the ability of generic pharmaceuticals to continue producing medicines 
which following examination, graduate from the mailbox to full patent protection. The 
ordinance was criticized for not addressing this issue. In response to the criticism, the 
                                                 
213 See, Médecins Sans Frontières “Examples of the Importance of India as The Pharmacy for the 
Developing World”. Available at: http://www.accessmed-
msf.org/documents/overview%20Jan%202007%20final.doc (Last Accessed on 12 April 2007).  
 
214 UNAIDS/WHO 2006 Report on the global AIDS epidemic. Available on line at: 
http://www.unaids.org/en/HIV_data/2006GlobalReport/default.asp (Last Accessed on 27th April 2007) 
 
215 Ibid and Chapter 2 above. 
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government in revising the Ordinance introduced a new provision to Section 11A of the 
2005 Act.216 
 
The newly inserted 3rd proviso to Section 11A, in  paragraph seven thereof provides that 
generic production can continue on cumulatively meeting the following conditions: (1) 
substantial investment has been incurred, (2) production and marketing has commenced 
prior to and continues subsequent to 1 January 2005, and (3) a reasonable royalty rate is 
paid to the patentee. Accordingly, patentees cannot institute infringement proceedings 
against these said producers.217 
 
Section 11A (7) seeks to ensure the continued production of currently available generic 
medicines. There remain however a number of issues that still require clarification. These 
concern the definitions of “significant investment” and “reasonable royalty”. There is 
concern that the requirement of significant investment may be open to differing 
interpretations. Similarly, in the case of reasonable royalty, guidelines may be necessary 
to reduce uncertainty and thus reduce the potential for strategic litigation by patent 
holders.218 In this regard, the practice in other countries may be instructive in terms of 
setting compensation or royalty rates for compulsory licenses. For example, the Japanese 
guidelines for royalty rates range between 2- 8%, and on average 4% and 5% rates are 
normally used in Canada and the United States.219 It is also not certain whether this 
provision is TRIPS compliant which could potentially lead to litigation in the WTO's 
DSU.220 
                                                 
216 See, FM Abbott, Amy Kapczynski and TN Srinivasan, “The Draft Patent Law”. 
Available at: www.hinduonnet.com/2005/03/12/stories/2005031201151000.htm (Last Accessed on7 April 
2007). (Hereinafter, Abbott, Kapczynski and Srinivasan). 
 
217 It is not certain whether this provision is in compliance with the Articles 70 and 28 of the TRIPS 
Agreement. It will thus be interesting to observe if it will be the subject of litigation in coming years. 
 
218See, the section on patentability above for an explanation of “Strategic litigation”.   
 
219  Musungu and Oh (2006). 
 
220 See, Lexorbis, Intellectual Property Practice, "India’s Patents Bill, 2005 - Is It TRIPS Compliant?" 
Available at:  http://www.mondaq.com/i_article.asp_Q_articleid_E_31717 (Last Accessed on 12th March 
2007).  
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4.4.2 The Patentability Criteria and Exemption from Patentability 
"Ever greening" is a common phenomenon in the pharmaceutical industry for instance, 
details of the 7,000 applications in India's mailbox have recently been made public. An 
analysis by the Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance revealed that only 250 of the applications 
could relate to new chemical entities and associated new drugs that were developed 
outside India during the 10-year period of 1995-2005,221 the other 6,750 therefore relate 
to, incremental inventions.222 
There was thus a fear that full TRIPS compliance would result in Indian generic 
producers manufacturing drugs which were invented even before 1995 being blocked 
from the market as foreign producers might be granted Indian patents for older drugs 
based on later-filed patents on incremental inventions. Very few Indian generic producers 
have the financial means to fight protracted legal battles with the major multinational 
pharmaceutical companies over the thousands of patents on incremental inventions.223 
These concerns underpin the importance of the Indian legislature utilizing the flexibility 
in Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement to exclude incremental inventions from 
patentability. Let us now examine how this has been attempted. 
Patentable subject matter in the field of pharmaceuticals and substances excluded from 
patentability are dealt with under Sections 2 and 3 of the 2005 Act. Three provisions in 
the 2005 Act stand out as utilizing the flexibility in Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 
by adopting a strict standard of patentability. They are the provisions dealing with (1) 
inventive step, (2) pharmaceutical substance and (3) exclusion from patentability. 
Inventive step:  
                                                 
221 (See National Institute for Health Care Management, “Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical 
Innovation”  (2002). 
 
222 Gopalkumar, KM and Tahir Amin , “Patents (Amendment) Bill 2005: A critique, Economic and 
Political”. Available at www.epw.org.in (Last acceded on 15 April 2007). (Hereinafter Gopalkumar and 
Amin). 
 
223 Ibid.  
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Section 2(j) of IPA 1970 defined an inventive step as “a feature that makes the invention 
not obvious to a person skilled in the art”. This definition has been replaced in the 2005 
Act by Article 2(f) which defines an inventive step as “a feature of an invention that 
involves a technical advance as compared to the existing knowledge or having economic 
significance or both that makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art”.  
The new provision has been criticized by Indian commentators such as Gopakumar and 
Amin, and internationally by the likes of Abbott and Musungu.  These commentators are 
of the view that with the inclusion of the words, “or having economic significance”, the 
requirement of technical advancement is compromised and diluted by the fact that a 
patent could be granted on economic significance alone. According to these 
commentators, the IPA 1970 provision is thus broadened to the benefit of patent holders 
and to the detriment of generic producers and public health. Some commentators have 
recommended that the word “or” be removed from this phrase.224 
Pharmaceutical substance: 
For the purposes of patentability, a pharmaceutical substance is defined by Section 2(h) 
of the 2005 Act as “any new entity involving one or more inventive steps. This definition 
has been criticized as too broad, allowing all types of pharmaceutical substances to be 
patented.  It has been submitted by Gopalkumar that the term ‘chemical’ should have 
been inserted so that the definition would read “any new chemical entity”. According to 
proponents of an amended text, the present definition facilitates ever greening, is TRIPS 
plus and encompasses every type of pharmaceutical entity, including but not limited to, 
formulations, pharmaceutical salts, isomers, polymorphs and their combinations.225  
The author supports the notion that a narrow scope of patentable pharmaceutical 
substance should be adopted so as to allow for a larger public domain and thus facilitate 
access to medicines; however, the fear expressed by Gopalkumar concerning the scope of 
                                                 
224 See inter alia Musungu and Oh, p21, Rangekar, p4 and Gopalkumar, p2. 
 
225 See, Gopalkumar and Amin.  
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entities falling within the scope of patentable under the Act is unfounded. This opinion is 
based on Article 3 of the 2005 Act. 
Article 3 provides that, “the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which 
does not result in the enhancement the known efficacy or the mere discovery of any new 
property or new use of such known process results in a new product or employs at least 
one new reactant”, would not be considered a patentable invention. The provision goes 
further in paragraph (d) stating, “ For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, 
polymorphs, metabolise, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, 
complexes, combinations and other derivatives of know substances shall be considered to 
be the same substance unless they differ significantly in properties with  regard to 
efficacy”. 
Thus, a reading of Article 3(d) reveals that the very entities which Gopalkumar fears 
patentable under the 2005 Act, are in fact, expressly excluded from patent protection. 
Section 3(d) was specifically targeted at preventing ever greening.  
Section 2, dealing with novelty along with section 3 and pre-grant opposition provisions 
of the 2005 Act were used to great effect during the January 2006 denial of the patent 
application for an anti cancer drug beta crystals of Imatinib mesylate marketed as glivic 
by the Swiss pharma major Novartis, one of the pharma 39 complainants in the case 
against South Africa.226 Following the denial of the patent application by the Indian 
Patent office, Novartis sought to have the denial reversed in the Indian Courts. The 
application of Novartis was opposed by a cache of Indian generic producers including 
Cipla and Ranbaxy pursuant to the reinstated pre grant opposition procedures.227  
The opposition was based on three arguments, (1) lack of inventive step/ obviousness and 
anticipation by Prior publication; (2) section 3(d) of the 2005 Act and (3) lack of priority 
                                                 
226 The pre-grant opposition provisions (which were reinstated following their removal by the Ordinance) 
can be found in Chapter V of the 2005 Act headed Representation and Opposition Proceedings.  
 
227 Médecins Sans Frontières Briefing Note (2006) “The case of Novartis’s challenge against the Indian 
government and what it could mean for millions of people across the globe”. Available online at: 
http://www.accessmedmsf.org/documents/Novartis%20Briefing.doc (Last Accessed on 28th April 2007). 
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due to Switzerland’s non membership of the Paris Union.228 Only the first two grounds 
for opposition are relevant for the current discussion. 
As regards the first ground, the opponents’ contention was that imatinib mesylate is 
known from prior publication in the US patent no. 5521184, the subject matter of the 
application was thus anticipated by the US patent. The opponents argued that there is no 
ingenuity or human intervention or novelty and inventive step in the preparation of beta 
crystal salt of imatinib mesylate as that is only a new form of a known substance and not 
an invention under 2005 Act. 
The applicants counter argued that the disclosure made in the US patent is of the free 
base, ‘imatinib’ and not its salt, imatinib mesylate, therefore the present invention 
involves a two-fold improvement over the prior art. (1) The imatinib free base is 
chemically changed into a salt form and (2) a particular crystal form, beta crystal form, of 
the salt is made through human intervention. Further that the US patent does not give any 
example for the preparation of imatinib mesylate nor are there any claims made for it; 
however they conceded that the US patent may embrace imatinib mesylate.  
It was held that the subject of the patent application was disclosed by prior art as it did 
not differ sufficiently from the US patent. Thus the opponents succeeded in proving that 
the application of Novartis was obvious, did not involve an inventive step and was 
anticipated by prior publication, it was hence, not an invention. 
Under the Second ground, as regards efficacy under Article 3(d), the opponents pointed 
out that the patent application itself states that wherever beta crystals are used, the 
imatinib freebase or other salts can be used equally in the treatment of diseases or in the 
preparation of pharmacological agents. Therefore, it was argued that, the present patent 
specification does not bring out any improvement in the efficacy of the beta crystals over 
the known substance. 
                                                 
228 For an explanation of the terms priority and Paris Union, see the section on mailbox protection in 
Chapter 3 above. 
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The applicant in countering the argument, first attacked section 3(d) itself stating that 
section 3(d) could not legitimately be used against the application. The reason being that 
the aspect of this section allowing a discovery to graduate into a patentable invention 
solely on the basis of efficiency defied logic and was therefore unable to stand legal 
scrutiny. It was further submitted that this aspect of section 3(d) in question was against 
the tenets of the 2005 Act as well as the established principals of jurisprudence. Finally, 
the applicant submitted that the beta crystal form of imatinib mesylate is an invention, a 
new substance and not a mere discovery. 
The judge concluded on the basis of the above arguments that  the opponents were 
correct in their assertion that the subject matter of this application was not patentable 
under section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970 as amended by the 2005 Act.229  
The verdict in the glivic case is crucial as it upheld the right of a WTO Member to reward 
only true innovation which is the rationale of a patent to begin with. The verdict thereby 
ensured that patentability standards do not unnecessarily restrict the public domain and 
thus access to medicines. A verdict in favor of Novartis would have restricted the ability 
of an India to supply the developing world with low cost generic versions of drugs based 
on a host of previously disclosed pharmaceutical substances.   
The glivic case is the first major decision on a patent application after India complied 
with the TRIPS regime and thus despite ongoing Novartis appeals, the case set a 
significant president in favor of access to medicines.  
This landmark decision was followed up in the context of AIDS drugs in March 2006 
when the Indian Network for People Living with HIV/AIDS (INP+) filed the an 
opposition to the patent claim for a fixed-dose combination (FDC) of zidovudine and 
lamivudine filed by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK).  INP+ like the opponents in the glivic case 
based its opposition on Section 3(d) of the 2005 Act arguing that the patent claim in 
question was not for a new invention but simply for the combination of two existing 
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drugs. Soon after its patent was opposed in India, GSK announced the withdrawal of all 
its patent applications for the FDC 230 
4.4.3 Compulsory Licensing 
Implementation of a pharmaceutical product patent regime in India means the ability of 
India to use compulsory licensing will be crucial for access to genuinely new medicines 
invented after 2005, both in India and abroad. Access to new medicines assumes 
particular importance when one considers that patients suffering from various diseases 
including HIV/AIDS inevitably develop a resistance to the medicines they are being 
treated with and will thus require newer second line medicines.231 
Compulsory Licensing in India is based on grounds almost as wide as public interest.    
The relevant standard is that “the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to 
the patented invention have not been satisfied” or “…the patented invention is not 
available to the public at a reasonable price".232 
The standard justifying compulsory licensing in India is thus wide enough to be useful in 
a wide range of circumstances. It directly seeks to ensure that the price of patented 
subject matter remains affordable to the public. The IPR Commission recommended that 
the grounds for compulsory licenses should be abundant, clear and unambiguous so as to 
facilitate their rapid and routine issuing,233  in this regard, Article 90 is important as it 
clearly defines "when reasonable requirements of the public [are] deemed not satisfied".  
Another favorable aspect of India's compulsory licensing regime is that it implements the 
flexibility in the non voluntary use provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that allows 
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Members to grant compulsory licenses to remedy practices determined to be anti-
competitive by a judicial or administrative authority.234 
 
The compulsory licensing provisions of the Indian Act have however been criticized by 
some commentators as being TRIPS plus. Some of these criticisms are as follows: 
The process of obtaining a compulsory license has been criticized as slow because with 
the exception of a national emergency, extreme emergency or public non-commercial 
use, a compulsory licence is available only after three years from the date of grant of the 
patent.  
The 2005 Act attempts to quicken the process with an amendment to Section 84(6) (iv). 
This amendment clarifies that the “reasonable time” after which voluntary license 
negotiations with the patent holder can be deemed unsuccessful is six months. The 
clarification is therefore an attempt to eliminate the possibility for delay in the process 
caused by ambiguity in the construction of “reasonable time”.   
This amendment has however been described as a cosmetic change on the basis that the 
real issue is the requirement which stipulates that only after the expiry of three years from 
the grant of a patent, can a person make an application to the controller for the grant of a 
compulsory licence.235 Hence, despite the amendment, a compulsory licence application 
does not have to be considered for at least three years and six months from the date of the 
grant of the relevant patent. 
Section 90 of IPA 1970 which elaborates and defines ‘reasonable requirement of the 
public’, the central basis for granting compulsory licenses, was amended by removing the 
phrase ‘manufacture in India’. Thus, while local non-working continues as one of the 
basis for revocation section,236 it is no more the case that a compulsory license may be 
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issued if domestic demand is not met to an “adequate extent or on reasonable terms from 
manufacture in India”.237 As discussed in Chapter 3 above,238 there is a strong case in 
favour of the stance that local working requirements are consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement as evidenced by inter alia, the withdrawal of the US from dispute settlement 
proceedings with Brazil in 2000. Removal of reference to local working requirements in 
compulsory licensing grounds may be justifiable as a means of India avoiding the 
possibility of being dragged into a WTO DSB dispute however this degree of caution was 
very unexpected considering that India was a third party in the US - Brazil consultations 
in the DSU.239  
Section 90(vii) of India’s 2005 Act by cross reference with section 84 (7) (a)(iii) 
specifically provides that where a compulsory license is granted for the supply of India’s 
domestic market, the licensee can also export the product where it is shown that “a 
market for export of the patented article manufactured in India is not being supplied or 
developed. This provision explicitly utilizes the limited flexibility allowed by Article 
31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement.240 
Another interesting feature of India’s patent regime that could prove indispensable to the 
pursuit of access to essential medicines in countries without manufacturing capacity is the 
country’s utilization of Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement. Section 90(ix) of the 2005 
Act allows a compulsory licensee in India to export a patented product to a territory that 
grants a compulsory license to remedy an anti competitive practice. Therefore, provided 
that countries on the import side actually grant compulsory licenses of the sort envisaged 
by Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement then they may have recourse to imports 
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unfettered by the Article 31(f) restriction, without the cumbersome procedures 
accompanying the 30th August 2003 mechanism and without the obligation to engage in 
prior negotiations with the patent holder. 
4.4.4 August 30th 2003 Decision 
As a potentially important exporter of medicines under the system established by the 
August 30th 2003 Decision, India’s implementation of the mechanism may have 
important consequences for countries without pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. 
The 2005 Act inserted section 92A which amends the requirement in the Ordinance that 
the exporters obtain a compulsory license from the importing country in addition to the 
license obtained from the Indian authorities. This provision had the potential to further 
complicate the utilization of an already complex mechanism in situations where there is 
no patent on a product in the importing country and thus no requirement or possibility of 
obtaining a compulsory license from that country. This would have resulted in a scenario 
whereby countries utilizing the LDC transition period pertaining to pharmaceutical 
products would not be able to import medicines from India despite meeting all the 
requirements of the August 30th 2003 decision.241 The waiver which India was 
instrumental in negotiating at the multilateral level was thus ironically in danger of being 
rendered meaningless (to LDCs) by the domestic implementation of that very same 
country. Section 92A of the 2005 Act rectifies this anomaly by providing that a 
compulsory license shall be available for manufacture and export of pharmaceutical 
products to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the 
pharmaceutical sector for the concerned products to address public health problems, 
provided a compulsory license has been granted by the importing country or that it has by 
notification or otherwise, allowed the importation of pharmaceutical products from India.   
It is clear from the above that India’s 2005 Act has made an effort to implement the 
country’s TRIPS obligations as to its patent regime in a manner that facilitates access to 
medicines both domestically and abroad while also adopting a cautious approach so as to 
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avoid being hauled into DSU proceedings at the WTO. Yet there are some provisions that 
demonstrate an overemphasis on caution at the expense flexibility: 
One such feature relates to the county’s interpretation of the non-discrimination clause 
which results in deletion of reference to local non-working as a ground for the grant of 
compulsory licenses.242 
Another feature that should be addressed is the existence of ambiguity within the Act for 
instance as to what constitutes reasonable compensation in regard to pre-existing generic 
manufacture provisions. These ambiguities may result in a string of strategic litigation 
that could hinder or at the very least delay access to generic medicines. 
Perhaps the most difficult to defend in the context of facilitating access to low cost 
generic medicines of all the features of the 2005 Act are the aspects that result in the 
necessity of at least three and a half years from the granting of a patent elapsing before 
the controller of patents actually deals with a compulsory license application. Article 31 
of the TRIPS Agreement contains no such requirement and it is thus unnecessary for the 
Indian law to do so. The country should thus consider shortening the period of time so as 
to avoid unnecessary delay in the production of life saving generic medicines under 
compulsory license. 
4.5 Zambia: A Brief Introduction 
Zambia is an LDC with a GDP per Capita of USD87 as of 2001 and was ranked a lowly 
143 out of 162 countries in UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) in 2001.243 Aside 
from the country’s HIV/AIDS prevalence rate among pregnant adult women of 18-20%, 
there are approximately 3 million clinical cases of malaria every year resulting in 50 000 
deaths annually.244 Zambia’s inclusion is thus due to its large public health 
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problem/needs, its status as an LDC and its membership in SADC. These factors make 
Zambia eligible to utilize a number of flexibilities in the pursuit of access to medicines 
for its people. Therefore the study will survey implementation of TRIPS flexibilities in 
Zambia from the vantage point of how access to medicines for domestic needs is enabled 
thereby. 
4.6 Implementation of TRIPS Flexibilities: The Case of Zambia 
4.6.1 Transition Periods 
 
Zambia is an LDC and as such, is not obliged by the TRIPS Agreement to grant patent 
protection to pharmaceutical products due to the 2002 extension to the Article 66.1 
transition period.  
 
The country however does grant patent protection for pharmaceutical products under The 
Zambian Patent Act of 1958 (as amended in 1982) as well as the Harare Protocol which 
is the legal instrument governing ARIPO (African Regional Industrial Property Organization) 
of which Zambia is a member.245 
 
As mentioned above, the transition period is of limited value for most LDC’s in the 
absence of pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. Zambia however, while not 
possessing the ability to manufacture APIs and despite being an LDC, is a country with 
some pharmaceutical reproductive manufacturing ability.246 In fact, health minister Dr 
Brian Chituwo disclosed that Zambia has started manufacturing ARVs with assistance 
from the Cuban government.247 Therefore if Zambia had utilized the LDC transition 
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period and refrained from implementing a product patent regime for pharmaceuticals, it 
could manufacture generic versions of patented medicines free from the imposition of 
any encumbrance by the rights of patent holders and freely provide those same generics 
to other LDCs without pharmaceutical product patent regimes.  
 
In this regard commentators have recommended that Zambia “roll back” patent 
protection.248 Certainly this option is legally possible as the pharmaceutical product 
patent transitional period extension for LDCs of 2002 does not contain a “no roll back” 
provision like that contained in the LDC transition period extension for general TRIPS 
obligations granted in 2005.  
 
It is not certain however whether this option would be politically viable. As noted in the 
previous chapter, one of the major factors inhibiting compulsory licensing has been extra 
legal/political pressure from interested developed countries and pharma.249 Some may 
argue that LDCs rolling back pharmaceutical product patent protection would be deemed 
inconsequential because pharma companies are unconcerned about LDC markets due to 
their lack of per capita purchasing power however this view neglects to consider LDC 
markets such as Bangladesh with significant markets as well as Zambia which possesses 
potential to develop greater pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity sufficient to supply 
existing pharma markets.  
 
Zambia experiencing benefits from rolling back patent protection could trigger a wave of 
such a roll back among larger LDC economies as well as those LDCs with potential to 
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develop into larger markets for pharma. Certainly the potential of Zambia’s roll back 
causing future financial losses to pharma would constitute incentive enough for the 
industry to rally industrialized country governments to impose political campaigns on 
countries who threaten their interests as seen in the past with Brazil, South Africa and 
very recently with Thailand.  
 
Therefore the decision to roll back patent protection is not as simplistic as suggested by 
authors like O’ Connell and certainly would require Zambia to carefully consider the 
implications of such action. A commission such as that initiated by Justice Ayyangar in 
India preceding the 1970 Act would be a suitable forum for such considerations. 
 
Although Zambia has not utilized its flexibility to refrain from adopting a pharmaceutical 
product patent regime, the country has utilized flexibilities as to certain aspects of its 
TRIPS obligations pursuant to the 2005 LDC transition period extension for general 
TRIPS obligations;250 The term of patent protection available in Zambia is one such 
example. 
 
Despite non utilization of the 2002 extension of the Article 66.1 transition period which 
applies to pharmaceutical products, Zambia only grants a minimum patent term of 16 
years as opposed to the minimum of 20 years mandated by the TRIPS Agreement.251 This 
is a significant utilization of the 2005 extension of the Article 66.1 LDC transition period 
because  medicines patented in Zambia fall into the public domain 4 years earlier than 
they would under a regime that complied with the term of protection mandated by the 
TRIPS Agreement.  
4.6.2 Patentability Criteria and Exemptions from Patentability 
                                                 
250 Negotiation of which was initiated by Zambia in the TRIPS Council. See, Transition Period for Least 
Developed Countries; Request for Extension, WTO document IP/C/W/457. 
 
251 See, Section 29 of the Zambian Patent Act 1958. 
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Section 38 of the Zambian Patent Act excludes from patentability a variety of subject 
matter including any discovery, scientific theory or mathematical method.  
The Act further gives the Registrar of Patents discretionary powers to refuse to patent any 
invention which claims as an invention a substance capable of use as food or medicine 
which is a mixture of known ingredients possessing only the aggregate of those 
ingredients' properties, or claims as an invention a process for producing such a substance 
by mere mixture.252  
The Zambian Patent regime thus adopts a high standard of innovation which promotes a 
large public domain and is not conducive to ever greening in the field of medicines. 
4.6.3 Compulsory Licensing 
 
The most notable and effective example of Zambia implementing and utilizing TRIPS 
flexibilities is the way the country has dealt with compulsory licensing. 
 
There are a number of broad grounds for the issuance of compulsory licenses contained 
in the Zambian Patent Act. For instance, any person who can show that he has been 
unable to obtain a voluntary license on reasonable terms may apply to the Registrar for a 
compulsory license on the basis that the reasonable requirements of the public for the 
invention are not being or will not be satisfied.253 This ground like the parallel provision 
in Indian patent law examined above (section 84(1)), can be interpreted in the context of 
public health to allow compulsory licensing where national demand for patented 
medicines is not being met by the patent holder due to unaffordable prices. 
 
                                                 
252 See, Edward D. Zulu, Rosemary M. Makano and Anessie Banda   “National Experiences and Plans to 
Implement a Sui Generis System of Protection in Zambia”. Available at: http://www.grain.org/bio-
ipr/?id=369 (Last Accessed on 12 March 2007). 
 
253 See, Section 37 of the Zambian Patent Act 1958. 
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Interestingly, the Zambian Patent Act includes a failure of local working ground.254 
Depending on one’s interpretation of the compatibility of such provisions with the TRIPS 
Agreement, the ground’s continued presence could be seen as either, utilization of the 
2005 extension of the Article 66.1 LDC transition period or a perfectly TRIPS compliant 
provision.255 In this regard, it will be interesting to see if Zambia maintains its local 
working ground beyond 2013. 
 
Zambia’s patent regime allows compulsory licensing on the grounds of anti competitive 
behavior by the patentee. It also provides that it may not be necessary to pay 
compensation when a compulsory license is issued on these grounds. The operation of 
this provision is compliant with Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement provided that the 
determination of anti competitive behavior is determined by a judicial or administrative 
authority and that the decision that no compensation be paid to the patentee is made 
pursuant the determination that no royalty being paid is necessary to remedy the anti-
competitive practice concerned. Therefore while Zambia is well placed to benefit from 
section 90(ix) of India’s 2005 Act as the recipient of imports under compulsory licenses 
of the sort envisaged by India’s 2005 Act in accordance with Article 31(k) of the TRIPS 
Agreement.   
 
While Zambia provides this ground for the issuance of a compulsory license in its 
legislation, it has never actually used the ground to justify issuing a compulsory license. 
The country may need to strengthen it competition law institutions and capacity before it 
can make use of this ground.256In this context, Zambia can benefit from regional 
cooperation within SADC by drawing on the experiences of South Africa where there is 
already considerable experience in utilizing competition law as a tool for facilitating 
access to affordable medicines as seen in the cases of Hazel Tau and others v 
                                                 
254 Ibid. 
 
255 See, the portion dealing with the compatibility of local working requirements with the non-
discrimination clause in the section on the non-discrimination clause in chapter 3 above. 
 
256 See, Avafia, Burger and Hartzenberg. 
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GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim and Treatment Action Campaign v Bristol 
Myers-Squibb respectively.257 
 
The Zambian Patent Act contains both the government use and state of emergency 
flexibilities permitted by Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement in sections 40 and 41 
respectively. The Section 40 government use provision provides for the use of patented 
inventions for the services of the state, it provides that “any government department or 
any person authorized in writing by the minister may make, use or exercise any 
invention”, in some cases without even having to pay royalties. Section 41 authorizes a 
minister of state to declare a period of emergency as a consequence of which the said 
minister is allowed to use any patented invention and enumerates a non-exclusive list of 
the purposes for which an invention may be used during a period of emergency.  Possible 
purposes include inter alia, “…the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the 
life of the community” and “securing a sufficiency of supplies and services essential to 
the well-being of the community”. 
 
These broad provisions allow the Zambian government to take whatever steps it 
considers necessary to deal with public health emergencies as determined by the 
government. This conforms to paragraph 5(c) of the Doha Declaration which provides as 
follows:  
 
“Each Member has the flexibility to determine what constitutes a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including 
those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency”. 
 
Crucially, Zambia used the flexibility created by Section 41 when the government issued 
a compulsory license for the local manufacture of ARVs. 
 
                                                 
257 For a comprehensive discussion of the two cases, consult the news letter of the Treatment Action 
Campaign (TAC) entitled, “Competition Commission Settlement Agreements Secure Access to Affordable 
Life-Saving Antiretroviral Medicines”, the document is available at:  
http://www.tac.org.za/newsletter/2003/ns10_12_2003.htm  
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4.6.4 Zambia’s Compulsory License 
 
In more detail, the compulsory license was granted by the Zambian Ministry of 
Commerce, Trade and Industry through Statutory Instrument 83 of 2004 in September 
2004 to a locally-incorporated company, Pharco Ltd. The compulsory license authorized 
the local company to produce a triple fixed dose combination (FDC) of lamivudine, 
stavudine and nevirapine under the brand names of Normavir 30 and Normavir and 
prescribed a royalty cap of 2.5% for the originators, BI and BMS. The royalty will only 
become payable if the originators apply for and are granted compulsory licenses for the 
drugs concerned in Zambia which interestingly are currently not patented in the 
country.258 
 
One aspect of the Zambian Compulsory license that could serve as an example to 
developing countries and LDCs grappling with access to medicines the world over is the 
direct reference to the Doha Declaration. 
 
“On 14 November, 2001 the World Trade Organization, while recognizing Members=92 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, declared the right of each Member State to take measures 
aimed at protecting public health and in particular to promote access to medicines for all, by 
utilizing to the full, the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement relating to among others, the granting 
of compulsory licenses, in cases which constitute a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency and of  public health crises including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria, or other epidemics which can represent a national emergency or other circumstances of 
extreme urgency”. 
 
The inclusion of the above text in paragraph 4 of the Zambian Compulsory license 
evidences the huge political impact that the Doha Declaration can have with respect to 
the utilization of TRIPS flexibilities by WTO Member states. The express reference to 
the Doha Declaration as a basis for the issuance of the country’s compulsory license and 
the fact that the measure remains unchallenged reflects the immense political importance 
that WTO Members attach to the instrument.  
                                                 
258 See, Avafia, Burger and Hartzenberg. 
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Some commentators have criticized Zambia for granting the compulsory license and 
issuing a state of emergency instead of directly going ahead with the manufacture of the 
FDC, commenting that the originator never applied for patents in Zambia and that the 
compulsory license was thus unnecessary.259 There is however a deficit of information on 
the patent status of the drugs concerned in Zambia. While it is true that no patent on the 
drugs was granted by Zambian authorities and that no patent application for any of the 
drugs was filed in the country, it is uncertain whether or not patents on the drugs were 
granted by ARIPO of which Zambia is a member. A patent granted by ARIPO will have 
effect in all its member countries, unless the patent is rejected by a member country 
within a 6 month time period. The lack of clarity on the status of patents indicates a 
common problem in many developing countries, where the patent offices are often not 
equipped to carry out comprehensive patent searches and inconsistencies are found in the 
information provided.260 Therefore, in lieu of clear information on the patent status of the 
drugs, it may have been a wise act of caution on the part of Zambia to grant a compulsory 
license thereby avoiding possible legal action that may have delayed availability of the 
FDC.  
 
4.6.5 Parallel Importation 
Zambian patent law has been criticized for unnecessarily restricting the possibility of 
parallel importation where drugs are sold for cheaper prices abroad than domestically by 
not including any provisions on exhaustion of IPRs.261 This criticism can be illustrated by 
highlighting the opportunity provided by section 90(vii) of India’s  2005 Act cross 
referenced with  section 84 (7) (a)(iii) discussed in the section on India above.  The 
inclusion of these provisions in India’s 2005 Act mean that if the Zambian market for a 
particular medicine is not being supplied or developed and if India were to grant a 
                                                 
259 Ibid. 
 
260 Cecelia Oh, “Compulsory Licences: Recent Experiences in Developing Countries” Int. J. Intellectual 
Property Management, Vol. 1, Nos. 1/2, 2006, (hereinafter, Oh).  
 
 
261 Musungu and Oh (2006), Annex 1. 
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domestic compulsory license for the production of that pharmaceutical, the non-
predominant portion of the drugs produced under the Indian license could be legitimately 
exported to Zambia.262  In this situation, if the pharmaceutical is patented in Zambia, the 
incorporation of an exhaustion regime into Zambia’s legislation (or alternatively but 
unlikely, a roll back of patent protection) would allow parallel importation without 
violating the any patent rights that may exist in Zambia. 
Zambia does have some capacity to manufacture generic equivalents of patented 
medicines therefore; the county’s patent regime not facilitating parallel importation can 
be mitigated through compulsory licensing for local manufacture of essential medicines. 
Such capacity however, is certainly not sufficient to deny the advantageous of the country 
incorporating an exhaustion regime to facilitate parallel importation. 
 
Thus one can conclude on Zambian patent law that various TRIPS flexibilities are 
implemented and utilized, yet there are various criticisms that remain irrefutable: 
 
Much like the Indian law, Zambia’s compulsory licensing regime can be criticized for 
requiring a period of at least three years from the date the patent is granted or four years 
from the date of the patent application, which ever being the longest to elapse before a 
compulsory license can be applied for. Mandating such a long period to elapse causes 
unnecessary delay to access to generic medicines for the sick and the dying and can thus 
result in the needless loss of an un-estimated number of lives. Therefore the country 
should take advantage of the TRIPS Agreement’s silence on the issue and reduce the time 
period required. 
 
A major criticism is that Zambian Patent Law does not implement the August 30th 2003 
mechanism and the various waivers provided therein. As an LDC, Zambia’s limited 
manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector would in no way prejudice its ability 
to import medicines under either of the waivers to Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement 
                                                 
262 See, O’ Carroll. 
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contained in the mechanism,263 while its membership in SADC, makes Zambia a prime 
candidate to benefit from the paragraph 6 waiver. Despite the country’s eligibility 
however, none of the August 30th 2003 waivers have been utilized by Zambia. 
 
The non utilization of the paragraph 2 waiver however, may be due in large part to the 
cumbersome nature of the procedural requirements attached and while the paragraph 6 
waiver is less demanding in terms of notifications, its utilization requires a significant 
increase of regional coordination by SADC member states.  
 
4.7 Bilateralism and its Potential to Undermine Multilateral Gains 
 
The flexibilities contained within the TRIPS Agreement can be used to varying extents to 
assist developing countries and LDCs to meet their public health needs while still 
conforming to the minimum standards of protection mandated by the instrument. These 
flexibilities are supplemented by a powerful interpretive tool in the Doha Declaration. 
There is however a consensus among international IP experts that the benefits accruing 
from the flexibilities achieved and clarified at the multilateral level are under threat of 
being negated by a recent proliferation of bilateral and free trade agreements involving 
the US in particular which contain TRIPS plus provisions.264 
 
The WTO has recognized the increasing amount Regional and Bilateral Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) involving the US and has referred to them as expanding preferential 
networks in a report by the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB).265 This trend in US 
                                                 
263 See, paragraphs 1, 2 and 6 of the August 30th 2003 Decision. 
 
264 According to Professor Drahos, a bilateral agreement that  
(a) requires a Member to implement a more extensive standard; or  
(b) which eliminates an option for a Member under a TRIPS standard,  
is a TRIPS plus standard.  The author agrees and will thus adopt that definition.  
See, Peter Drahos and Herchel Smith,” Bilateralism in Intellectual Property”. Available at:  
http://www.maketradefair.org/assets/english/bilateralism.pdf (Last Accessed on 16th April 2007). 
(Hereinafter, “Drahos, Bilateralism in IP”.   
  
265 Report by the WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review, United States, WT/TPR/S/126, 17 December 
2003, at p.viii, para. 8. 
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Trade policy was previously identified by world trade expert John Jackson according to 
whom:  
 
“…the US has moved away from its earlier support for multilateralism and most- favored-nation 
(MFN) to a more pragmatic [from a US perspective at least] – some might say ad hoc approach – 
of dealing with trading partners on a bilateral basis…”266  
  
In order to illustrate how important flexibilities can be eroded by TRIPS plus provisions 
in Regional and Bilateral FTAs, it is necessary to examine relevant portions of various 
Agreements involving the US, namely, the Dominican Republic-Central America Free 
Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), US-Singapore, US-Jordan and US-Morocco.267 
 
4.8 The Flexibilities Affected 
 
4.8.1 Term of Protection 
 
Article 15.9 of CAFTA-DR requires the establishment of a new, TRIPS plus standard for 
review of patent applications. Under the new standard established in the CAFTA-DR, a 
maximum of five years is allowed for the review of a patent application, after which the 
term of patent protection must be extended to compensate for the lack of patent 
protection during the period of review.268  
 
When one considers that mailbox protection and EMRs are granted to the subject of 
patent applications and that these two forms of protection are certainly adequate 
compensation for the lack of patent protection during the period when a patent 
                                                 
266 J. Jackson, “The World Trading System”, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., London, 1997, 173.  
 
267 The text of all FTAs involving the US are available at: 
http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Section_Index.html (Last Accessed on 20th April 2007) 
 
268 See, Frederick M. Abbott, “The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the 
Contradictory Trend in Bilateral and Regional Free Trade Agreements”. Available at: www.quno.org (Last 
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application is being reviewed,269 it becomes apparent that CAFTA-DR unnecessarily 
extends the period of patent protection and will thus unduly delay patented medicines 
falling into the public domain.  
 
4.8.2 Compulsory Licensing 
 
Musungu and Oh have identified two ways that FTAs have restricted the ability of 
countries to execute compulsory licensing. The first is an indirect limitation and operates 
via the intersection of data protection and compulsory licensing while the second is a 
direct, express restriction of compulsory licensing grounds.270 Let us now turn examining 
these two instances of limitation. 
  
The intersection of Data Protection and Compulsory Licensing: 
 
Article 15:10(3)(a) of CAFTA-DR provides as follows: 
 
“A third party (generic) producer, relying on evidence or information concerning the safety and 
efficacy of a product that was previously approved, such as evidence of prior marketing approval 
in the Party or in another territory”, must be prevented from obtaining marketing approval such as 
will allow that third party to market the product “during the term of that patent, unless by consent 
or acquiescence of the patent owner”.271 
 
If approval cannot be granted for marketing during the term of the patent without the 
consent or acquiescence of the patent owner, this will effectively preclude the possibility 
of government use or compulsory licensing. Even if a license on the patent is granted to a 
generic producer/importer, the patent owner will be able to prevent marketing of the 
equivalent medicine (because it will not consent or acquiesce to marketing). This, it will 
                                                 
269 See the section in Chapter 3 above on Mailbox and EMRs. 
 
270 Musungu and Oh (2006), p 111. 
 
271 See, Abbott, “Doha and Contradictory FTAs” 
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not be permissible to put the generic product on the market regardless of the grant of a 
compulsory license.272 
 
The Restriction of Compulsory Licensing Grounds: 
 
A limited number of FTAs such as US- Singapore and US- Jordan, contain provisions 
which restrict the grounds on which compulsory licenses can be issued.  
 
For instance, the US-Singapore FTA does not allow non-voluntary use of patented 
subject matter except in three situations, (1) to remedy practices deemed after judicial or 
administrative process to be anti competitive, (2) in cases of public, non-commercial use 
and (3) in the case of a national emergency or extreme urgency.273 
 
This negates the recognition in paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration that, “Each 
member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the 
grounds upon which such licenses are granted”. 
 
4.8.3 Parallel Importation 
 
In Article 15.9(4), the Parties abandon their right under Article 6 of the TRIPS 
Agreement and express confirmation in Paragraph 5(d) of the Doha Declaration to 
determine their own policies with respect to exhaustion of rights and agree to prevent 
parallel importation of patented subject matter. Footnote 9 to this provision provides that 
the relinquishment may be limited to cases “where the patent owner has placed 
restrictions on import by contract or other means”, however, that does not mitigate the 
fact that the parties have mandated a limitation not contemplated in the TRIPS 
Agreement and of the sort that the Doha Declaration expressly attempts to prevent. 
 
                                                 
272 Ibid. 
 
273 See, Article 16.7(6) of the US-Singapore FTA. 
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4.8.4 Exemptions from Patentability 
 
The US-Morocco FTA provides in relevant part that: 
 
“patents shall be available for any new uses or methods of using known products, including new 
uses of known products for the treatment of humans and animals”.274  
 
Therefore, Morocco is obliged to grant patent protection to products which exhibit a low 
standard of innovation and thus facilitate ever greening.  As mentioned in the previous 
chapter,275 the practice of ever greening unduly delays generic competition and thus 
inhibits access to cheaper generic equivalents of brand medicines.  
 
4.8.5 The Dissenting View on Bilateralism in IP 
 
Despite the apparent contradiction between the Doha Declaration and the provisions 
discussed above, it is possible to argue that bilateralism in IP has not limited the 
flexibility of the parties concerned. This argument is based on two instruments, (1) non 
derogation clauses and (2) side letters with operative language.276 It is necessary to 
illustrate the argument by discussing examples of the two instruments. 
 
Non Derogation Clauses: 
 
An example of a non derogation clause can be found in CAFTA-DR, the clause reads as 
follows: 
 
“Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to derogate from the obligations and rights of 
one Party with respect to the other by virtue of the TRIPS Agreement or multilateral intellectual 
property agreements concluded or administered under the auspices of the World Intellectual 
                                                 
274 See, Article 15.9 (2). 
 
275 See the section in chapter 3 on exemptions fro patentability. 
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Property Organization and to which they are party”.277 
 
Indeed, this provision might initially appear intended to preserve the flexibilities 
accorded to the parties under the TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Declaration. Yet 
despite the non derogation clause, it can be seen from the discussion above that various 
other provisions in the FTA’s IP Chapter very directly constrain the rights a WTO 
Member has under the TRIPS Agreement by effectively precluding the exercise of 
flexibilities.  
 
Side Letters with Operative Language: 
 
The US-Morocco FTA does not contain a non-derogation clause like CAFTA-DR. 
Instead, the Agreement attempts to ameliorate express derogation from rights under the 
TRIPS Agreement by means of a draft exchange of side letters with operative language. 
One such letter reads in relevant part as follows: 
 
The implementation of the provisions of Chapter 15 of the Agreement [the IP Chapter] does not 
affect the ability of either Party to take necessary measures to protect public health by promoting 
access to medicines for all. This will concern, in particular, cases such as HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics as well as circumstances of extreme urgency or 
national emergency. 
 
Much like what we saw in he discussion on the non derogation clause in CAFTA-DR, the 
exchange of letters does not diminish the fact that there are a number of provisions in the 
US-Morocco FTA that directly constrain the flexibility of Members contained in the 
TRIPS Agreement and affirmed by the Doha Declaration. Secondly, it is not clear what 
legal effect an exchange of letters between parties to a binding international instrument is 
expected to have in a legal dispute. Moreover, the letter incorporates limits not found in 
the Doha Declaration and which were specifically rejected during negotiations on the 
August 30th 2003 Decision such as (1) an apparent restriction on the scope of diseases 
and (2) a limitation to situations of emergency. Thus, while denying any intention to 
                                                 
277 See, Article 15.1. 
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affect public health, the parties are directly limiting the flexibilities of TRIPS Agreement 
and supplemented by the Doha Declaration and the August 30th 2003 Decision. 
 
Therefore it is clear that the FTAs erode Members’ TRIPS flexibilities. Hence we may 
conclude that should countries like Zambia with sizable public health problems except 
such restrictions to their ability to utilize TRIPS flexibilities, it would have negative 
implications for access to essential medicines needed to deal with the same. Worse still, if 
India, the global lynchpin in supplying affordable generic medicines to countries without 
manufacturing capacity was to accept such severe limitations to its patent regime, it 
would have disastrous effects for access to medicines in many countries that rely on 
Indian generic pharmaceuticals.  
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that WTO Members which make bilateral 
concessions to the US in the field of IP, will be obliged to extend those concessions to all 
other WTO Members.278 This is because there is no exception to the Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) obligation in the TRIPS Agreement of the sort provided in the GATT by 
Article XXIV of the latter.279 
 
4.8.6 Why Do Developing Countries Accept TRIPS Plus Obligations in FTAs? 
 
In light of the consequences for access to medicines that can be brought about by the IP 
provisions in the FTAs discussed above, why are countries willing to accept such 
limitations to their flexibility? Three reasons have been identified by the author: 
 
First, most developing countries are not in a position to expand export opportunities in 
the pharmaceutical sector or to protect a substantial domestic pharmaceutical sector. 
Hence because the domestic industry is not affected, substantial restrictions in FTAs on 
access to pharmaceutical products may be accepted within highly complex provisions 
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with respect to patents and regulatory approval without close examination by public 
health officials.280  
 
Secondly, the negotiations whether multilateral or bilateral are multi-sectoral and thus IP 
issues cannot be been seen in isolation. Most developing countries rely on the agricultural 
sector for exports and thus have a huge interest in increasing agricultural market access to 
developed countries. This is often used by industrialized countries as leverage to gain 
concessions on IP for the benefit of pharma.281  
 
The final reason identified is the threat of trade sanctions under Section 301 of the US 
Trade Act. As discussed above,282 Section 301 of the US Trade Act is the provision used 
by the USTR to address what are deemed unfair trading practices; this includes inter alia 
unfair practices concerning IPRs. An investigation under Section 301 may culminate in 
the imposition of trade sanctions by the US. Hence, a developing country may simply 
decide to adopt a ‘TRIPS plus’ measure in order to avoid action by the US under the 301 
process.283 On the effectiveness of Section 301 in achieving US trade objectives, it is 
worth noting the following remark by a USTR official:  
 
“One fascinating aspect of the Special 301 process occurs just before we make our annual 
determinations, when there is often a flurry of activity in those countries desiring not to be listed 
or to be moved to a lower list. IP laws are suddenly passed or amended, and enforcement activities 
increase significantly”.284 
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Developing countries with public health problems should preserve their flexibility to deal 
with the same. To this end, they should as far as possible, refrain from undertaking 
TRIPS plus obligations in bilateral negotiations with the US and other trading partners. 
This is not as easy as it sounds considering the tremendous importance that most 
developing countries attach to agricultural market access to industrialized countries as 
well as the persuasive powers of Section 301. It may thus be necessary for the TRIPS 
Council to intervene on behalf of developing countries in this regard. Some authors have 
accordingly advocated that developing country WTO Members “form a coalition aimed 
at converting the TRIPS Council from a body that secures a platform to one that polices a 
ceiling”.285 This would entail a new agenda for the TRIPS Council in which rollback of 
TRIPS plus standards would be a central instrument. 
 
One can conclude from the above discussion of the Indian and Zambian patent regimes 
that developing countries on both ends of the generic supplier/consumer spectrum have 
implemented a number of TRIPS flexibilities. Yet there is certainly room for these 
countries to take fuller advantage of TRIPS flexibilities and thus one would struggle to 
argue that their implementation has been adequate. These countries should seek to 
implement and utilize the full range of flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement 
with a view to improving access to essential medicines both domestically and throughout 
all countries in need. FTAs with TRIPS plus provisions have the potential to paralyze the 
utilization of TRIPS flexibilities. Developing countries and LDCs should head the 
examples of this occurrence discussed above and take care not to fall into that trap. 
 
5. Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
5.1 A Brief Overview 
 
                                                 
285  Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite have advocated the formation of such a coalition and reform f the 
TRIPS Council. 
 See, Drahos, “Bilateralism in IP”, p 16. 
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The TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration and the August 30th 2003 Decision are 
currently the three major instruments laying the framework for the International IPR 
protection/public health debate. The instruments attempt to strike a balance between 
innovators of pharmaceutical technology and its developing country and LDC users in the 
arena of public health. 
 
The Uruguay Round saw a massive victory for the interests of pharma, duly represented 
by developing countries. They were able to secure the most extensive package of IPRs 
for their products including the rights conferred unto a patentee; non discrimination; 
mailbox and EMRs; and enforcement related obligations. As a result of these provisions, 
their interests are secured to the extent of conferring a minimum twenty year monopoly 
(even longer through the operation of EMRs and where a national patent system allows 
ever greening through incremental inventions. At the conclusion of Uruguay Round, the 
preponderance of conclusions was certainly in favour of phama. 
 
The TRIPS flexibilities including inter alia transition periods; patentability criteria and 
exemption from patentability; parallel importation; and compulsory licensing are the 
tools available to users of pharmaceutical technology to redress the imbalance 
perpetuated by IPRs conferred to innovators.  The Doha Declaration is an important legal 
and political instrument confirming the right of countries to use TRIPS flexibilities. 
 
Compulsory licensing is perhaps the most important of the TRIPS flexibilities. It is 
subject to a number of limitations imposed by the text of the TRIPS Agreement. Of 
particular importance for countries with limited to no manufacturing capacity in the 
pharmaceutical sector is Article 31(f). This provision limits the exploitation of 
compulsory licensing by importation.  The August 30th 2003 waivers and the 2005 
Amendment Decision on a not yet effective amendment of the TRIPS Agreement were 
thus propounded in the TRIPS Council to deal with the Article 31(f) restriction.  
 
5.2 The TRIPS Flexibilities: Final Conclusions and Recommendations 
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As to the sufficiency of the TRIPS flexibilities analysed to tilt the balance created by the 
TRIPS Agreement in the direction of users and the adequacy of their implementation, the 
thesis concluded as follows: 
 
5.2.1 Transition Periods 
 
The Article 65.4 transition period which allowed developing countries that had excluded 
pharmaceutical products from patentability to continue this policy. The transition period 
expired in 2005 after becoming a lynchpin in the IPR/public health debate. 
 
Pursuant to Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and a TRIPS Council Decision 
extending the transition period therein, LDC WTO Members are entitled to refrain from 
implementing product patent regimes. In theory the implementation of this flexibility 
removes until 2016 any barriers that pharmaceutical product patents may impose on the 
ability of LDCs to produce, import and export medicines among themselves. Realistically 
however, benefits can only be derived from this opportunity if LDCs improve their 
technological bases and develop capacity for the production of generic medicines. 
 
Implementation: 
 
India: 
 
India’s utilization of the Article 65.4 transition period until 2005 was crucial in sustaining 
the gains made from its decision to refrain from incorporating a product patent regime 
pursuant to the Ayyangar Committee. 
 
Zambia: 
 
Zambia is eligible to utilize the Article 66.1 transition period yet it has a product patent 
regime. This has prompted criticism by various commentators. Critics are of the view that 
Zambia should roll back pharmaceutical product protection. Conversely, some 
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commentators opine that the benefits offered by the transitional period are limited in the 
absence of a general increase of pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity in LDCs. This 
coupled with the threat of legal and political campaigns by pharma against the country 
may be contributory factors in Zambia’s continued provision of patents for 
pharmaceutical products.   
 
Recommendations: 
 
The only real solution to the problem of access to medicines in countries with limited to 
no pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity is to remedy this lack of capacity. 
 
As a means to attaining pharmaceutical self sufficiency, LDCs should encourage Indian 
generic drug companies to invest and set up in those LDCs. This would yield almost 
immediate benefits in terms of local manufacture of essential medicines as well as long 
term benefits as to the transfer of technology.  
 
The major barrier that comes to mind is the lack of purchasing power and investment 
risks like infrastructure constraints, bureaucracy etc in the LDCs resulting in a lack of 
incentive for the generic companies.  
 
In response to this barrier, any loss of profit incurred by investors could be offset by 
financial contributions investment guarantees from the LDC governments. Other 
investments risks could be mitigated by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) of the World Bank Group. 
 
This solution may be expensive to LDC governments in the short term but surely it would 
cost those countries more to suffer the strain on their health care systems caused by large 
numbers of patients and the losses to the economy caused by the incapacitation of the 
most economically active age group(a common feature of HIV/AIDS)?  
 
5.2.2 The Patentability Criteria and Exemption from Patentability 
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Setting the standard of innovation necessary to derive patent protection is a crucial facet 
of any IP regime. The TRIPS Agreement gives Members considerable flexibility in this 
important exercise.  
 
Implementation 
 
India  
 
The glivic case exemplifies the high standard of innovation required for a medicine to 
attain patent protection India. 
 
Zambia 
 
The Zambian Patent regime adopts a high standard of innovation which promotes a large 
public domain and specifically excludes ever greening in the field of medicines. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
Developing countries the world over can learn from the high patentability standards in 
India and Zambia. The two countries are clearly aware that the most effective way to 
prevent ever greening is to root out incremental patents. 
 
5.2.3 Parallel Importation 
 
Countries that incorporate an international exhaustion regime are eligible to meet their 
local demand for medicines by importing from cheaper overseas suppliers if they so wish 
as confirmed by paragraph 5(b) of the Doha Declaration. 
 
Implementation: 
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India: 
 
India’s patent regime specifically provides that where a compulsory license is granted for 
the supply of India’s domestic market, the licensee can also export the product where it is 
shown that “a market for export of the patented article manufactured in India is not being 
supplied or developed. Although this provision was dealt with under India’s 
implementation of compulsory licensing, it represents a significant opportunity for 
countries whose need for affordable medicines ids not being met domestically. These 
countries will however need to have in place, an international exhaustion regime wide 
enough to include products put on the market by compulsory licensing. 
 
Zambia: 
 
Zambia does not have an international exhaustion regime in place and thus importing 
drugs that are locally patented would infringe patentees’ rights. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
Zambia and other countries should take advantage of the opportunity presented by India’s 
compulsory licensing laws and incorporate an international exhaustion regime wide 
enough to allow the importation of drugs placed on the market by a compulsory license. 
 
5.2.4 Compulsory Licensing and Government Use 
 
This flexibility has been recognized by a number of authors as the most important tool for 
addressing the adverse effects of patent rights on public welfare and particularly in the 
context of health.  
 
Implementation: 
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India:  
 
The expiry in 2005 of the Article 65.4 transition period means that India’s 
implementation of this flexibility is set to prove crucial for future access to affordable 
generic medicines within India and abroad. India’s patent regime contains a number of 
compulsory licensing provisions that make use of various flexibilities in the wording of 
the TRIPS Agreement and that facilitate manufacture and exportation to countries in need 
of affordable medicines. There is however, room for improvement. 
 
Zambia: 
 
Similarly, Zambia has a vibrant compulsory licensing regime which makes use of various 
flexibilities in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. The country successfully issued a 
compulsory license in 2004. In particular, Zambia’s express reference to the Doha 
Declaration in the text of the compulsory license can serve as an example to all countries 
with public health problems. 
 
Recommendations: 
 
Both India and Zambia should speed up the process that must be followed for the 
issuance of a compulsory license by removing the minimum three year waiting period 
from the grant of a patent in their respective patent regimes. 
 
5.2.5 The August 30th 2003 Decision 
 
Some have hailed the Decision as resolving the Article 31(f) problem. Others have 
labelled it unworkable pointing to the numerous and complex administrative 
requirements attached. The resolution of that debate can only be resolved once the 
mechanism is tested by utilization. To date, however, the preponderance of conclusions 
does seem to agree with opponents of the Decision. The fact that not a single patient has 
yet benefited from medicines imported thereby is a telling factor. 
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Implementation: 
 
India: 
 
India has implemented the August 30th 2003 Decision as a potential exporting Member. 
The relevant provision allows for compulsory licensing for manufacture and export of 
pharmaceutical products to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity 
in the pharmaceutical sector for the concerned products to address public health 
problems.  If the August 30th 2003 mechanism proves effective, India’s implementation 
could prove crucial. 
 
Zambia: 
 
Zambia is yet to incorporate the August 30th 2003 Decision into its Patent legislation. 
This is an area the country may want to improve upon should the August 30th 2003 
mechanism prove effective.  
 
Recommendations: 
 
With regard to the August 30th 2003 Decision, Zambia should study the benefits of 
implementing the paragraph 1 waiver and rally its SADC partners to undertake a uniform 
implementation of the paragraph 6 waiver. 
 
Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement does not require prior negotiations and is not 
subject to the Article 31(f) problem. In the limited circumstances where India were to 
manufacture drugs pursuant to the provision in its law that implements the Article 31(k) 
flexibility, the drugs could be exported to countries with limited to no manufacturing 
capacity free of the administrative, financial and time burdens associated with the August 
30th 2003 Decision.  
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Regardless of the August 30th mechanism or any flexibilities in the wording of the TRIPS 
Agreement, the best solution is for countries with limited to no pharmaceutical 
manufacturing capacity to become self sufficient. In this regard, please refer to the 
recommendations made as to transition periods above. 
 
5.3 Bilateralism: A Word of Caution 
 
The gains made by developing countries and LDCs in securing the TRIPS flexibilities 
will come to naught if they allow bilateral Agreements such as FTAs to erode their policy 
space. In this regard, countries could reject TRIPS plus provisions in bilateral 
negotiations where possible. The TRIPS Council should be explored as a forum to curb 
bilateral negotiation difficulties of countries with limited bargaining power.  
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